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INTRODUCTION

S ignificant constitutional developments take different forms and
occur under different circumstances. Most are noticed and
taken seriously because they directly involve the constitutional
rights of individuals.' A few, on the other hand, involve issues
1. Significant Supreme Court cases involving the rights of individuals under the Bill of
Rights or the fourteenth amendment abound. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct.
2841 (no right to homosexual sodomy), reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 29 (1986); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (free speech); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to abortion); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (procedural due process rights); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (right of criminal suspects to be informed of rights); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libel/free speech); Brown v. Board of
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seemingly less relevant to individuals. These developments, which
are usually less politically charged, involve the broad, structural
issues of federalism and the separation of powers. Such was the
case with the passage of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1982,3 signed into law by President Ronald Reagan on September 3, 1982.
Widely regarded as the largest tax increase in United States
history,4 TEFRA will increase the federal government's net
budget receipts by $205.3 billion during fiscal years 1983 through
1987. 5 The day after the measure was finally passed by Congress,
however, its constitutionality was challenged by a group of eighteen members of the House of Representatives.' They claimed
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (equal protection rights).
2. The recent invalidation of a portion of the so-called Gramm-Rudman balanced
budget law shows that separation of powers issues can still attract substantial political attention. See Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C.) (three-judge court), afd sub
noma.Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
3. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324
(1982) [hereinafter TEFRA] (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
4. See, e.g., 128 CONG. Rm E3888 (daily ed. Aug. 13, 1982) (statement of Rep. Porter:
"the largest tax increase in U.S. history"); 128 CONG. REQ_ S8650 (daily ed. July 19, 1982)
(statement of Sen. Long: "the largest tax increase ever recommended in a single piece of
legislation"); Buckley, Exit Reaganomics?, NAT'L REV., Aug. 20, 1982, at 1042 ("the highest
single 'peacetime tax increase in U.S. history"); McGrath, A No-FingerprintsTax Bill, NEwswEER, Aug. 9, 1982, at 16 ("a record $99 billion tax increase"); A Taxing Week on the Hill,
NEWSWEEK, Aug. 2, 1982, at 19 ("a bill that . . . would raise a record $99 billion in new
tax revenue"); Wiener, ABC's of the Big Boosts Ahead for Taxpayers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,

Aug. 2, 1982, at 44 ("the biggest tax boost in history"); Rowen, $100-Billion Tax Bill Agonizing to House Republicans, Wash. Post, Aug. 8, 1982, at GI, col. 2 ("the biggest tax increase on record"); Tyrrell, The Great GOP Tax Increase, Wash. Post, Aug. 2, 1982, at A15,
col. 1 ("the largest peacetime tax measure in history").
The use of this label itself became newsworthy. See Measuring the Size of the Tax Bill,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1982, at D16, col. 3.
5.

STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., 2D SEss., GENERAL EXPLANA-

TION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL REsPONSInILrrY Ar

OF

1982, at 454 (Jt. Comm. Print 1982).
6. Moore v. United States House of Representatives, 553 F. Supp. 267 (D.D.C. 1982),
af'd, 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985). This first origination clause challenge to TEFRA differed from those by individual taxpayers that followed
because it raised the special issue of the standing of members of Congress to challenge the
constitutionality of a federal statute. Indeed, it was on this ground that the district court
dismissed the plaintiffs' action. Moore, 553 F. Supp. at 268. The court of appeals, over a
vigorous opinion by Judge Antonin Scalia concurring in the result but disagreeing on the

standing issue, found that the Congressmen had standing and yet affirmed the district
court's dismissal as "a proper exercise of the court's remedial discretion to withhold declaratory relief." Moore, 733 F.2d at 948.
The Moore plaintiffs included nine republicans and nine democrats: W. Henson Moore
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that TEFRA was passed in violation of the origination clause of
the United States Constitution, which states: "All Bills for raising
Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the
Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other
Bills."17 Individual taxpayers have raised similar claims in more
than fifty cases since 1982.8
(R-La.), Philip M. Crane, (R-Il.), Elliott H. Levitas (D-Ga.), Stephen L. Neal (D-N.C.),
James G. Martin (R-N.C.), James D. Santini (D-Nev.), Carroll Hubbard, Jr. (D-Ky.), John H.
Rousselot (R-Cal.), Lawrence P. McDonald (D-Ga.), Richard T. Schulze (R-Pa.), Billy Lee
Evans (D-Ga.), Ed Bethune (R-Ark.), Richard C. Shelby (D-Ala.), Bob Stump (R-Ariz.),
Daniel B. Crane (R-Ill.), James E. Jeffries (R-Kan.), J. Patrick Williams (D-Mont.), and Larry
E. Craig (R-Idaho). Moore v. United States House of Representatives, Complaint of Aug.
18, 1982, at 1-3.
This Comment does not address the standing of Members of Congress to bring such
claims under the origination clause. For an argument supporting Congressmen's standing,
see Comment, The OriginationClause, the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, and
the Role of the Judiciary, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 419 (1983); for an argument against Congressmen's standing, see Case Comment, Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives: A Possible
Expansion of Congressmen's Standing to Sue, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 417 (1985). For recent
treatment of the general issue of Congressmen's standing, see Synar v. United States, 626
F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C.) (three-judge court), affd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct.
3181 (1986).
7. US. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl.1.
8. Of the more than 50 reported and unreported origination clause challenges to
TEFRA researched for this Comment, most found their way to court under the following
similar circumstances. Sections 6702 and 6703 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§
6702, 6703 (1982), added by TEFRA, allow the IRS to label as "frivolous" tax returns
meeting certain statutory criteria and to assess a $500 civil penalty against a taxpayer filing
such a return. The plaintiffs in each of these cases paid 15% of the fine assessed them,
asked for a refund from the IRS, and, upon denial of the refund, filed suit. Of these cases,
the following have been reported: Texas Ass'n of Concerned Taxpayers, Inc. v. United
States, 772 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2265 (1986); Hudson v. United
States, 766 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1985); Jolly v. United States, 764 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1985);
Boday v. United States, 759 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1985); Armstrong v. United States, 759
F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1985); Wardell v. United States, 757 F.2d 203 (8th Cir. 1985); Heitman v. United States, 753 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1984); Schoffner v. United States, 627 F. Supp.
167 (S.D. Ohio 1985); Phelps v. United States, 56 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 85-5853 (E.D. Wash.
1985); House v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 139 (W.D. Mich. 1984), affd mem., 787 F.2d
590 (6th Cir. 1986); Vaughn v. United States, 589 F. Supp. 1528 (W.D. La. 1984);
Liljenfeldt v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 966 (E.D. Wis.), afd, 753 F.2d 1077 (7th Cir.
1984); Karpowycz v. United States, 586 F. Supp. 48 (N.D. Il1. 1984); Scull v. United States,
585 F. Supp. 956 (E.D. Va. 1984); Rowe v. United States, 583 F. Supp. 1516 (D. Del.),
affd, 749 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1984); Aune v. United States, 582 F. Supp. 1132 (D. Ariz.
1984), a.ffd sub nom. Brasseur v. United States, 765 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1985); Ueckert v.
United States, 581 F. Supp. 1262 (D.N.D. 1984); Reed v. United States, 581 F. Supp. 718
(D. Colo. 1984); Stamp v. Commissioner, 579 F. Supp. 168 (N.D. Ill.
1984); Kloes v.
United States, 578 F. Supp. 270 (W.D. Wis. 1984); Milazzo v. United States, 578 F. Supp.
248 (S.D. Cal. 1984); Tibbetts v. Secretary of the Treasury, 577 F. Supp. 911 (W.D.N.C.
1984); Bliss v. United States, 54 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 84-5968 (E.D. Wash. 1984); McCauley v.
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This Comment focuses on the constitutional controversy surrounding the passage of TEFRA. Specifically, this Comment argues that TEFRA's passage did indeed violate the origination
clause of the Constitution because TEFRA, a bill designed to raise
revenue, was originated by the Senate as an "amendment" substituting TEFRA 9 for the text of a House bill that was not a "bill for
raising revenue" within the meaning of the origination clause.
While the origination clause is perhaps a more obscure constitutional provision than those in the Bill of Rights, 10 it nonetheless
United States, 53 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 84-1386 (E.D. Wash. 1984); Hamrick v. Commissioner,
53 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 84-1384 (W.D. La. 1984); Howard v. United States, 53 A.F.T.R.2d
(P-H) 84-1381 (E.D. Wash. 1984); Gimelli v. United States, 53 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 84-1032
(E.D. La. 1984); McDowell v. Secretary of the Treasury, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P9459
(D.N.J. 1984); Sivertsen v. United States, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P9409 (D. Conn.
1984); Whitman v. Commissioner, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P9393 (W.D. La. 1984); Lopez v. United States, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P9356 (D.N.M. 1984); Kane v. United
States, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P9229 (D. Ariz. 1984); Bearden v. Commissioner, 575 F.
Supp. 1459 (D. Utah 1983).
Nine cases challenging TEFRA were brought to court on motions to quash an IRS summons under 26 U.S.C. § 7602. Of these, the six reported cases are: Harris v. United States,
758 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1985); Morris v. United States, 616 F. Supp. 246 (E.D. Mich. 1985);
Burdette v. United States, 57 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 86-1222 (M.D. Ala. 1985); Schlick v.
United States, 586 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. I1. 1984); Tucker v. United States, 54 A.F.T.R.2d
(P-H) 84-6406 (N.D. Ind. 1984); Frent v. United States, 571 F. Supp. 739 (E.D. Mich.
1983); appeal dismissed mem., 734 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1984).
Two cases challenging TEFRA were brought by citizens on origination clause grounds
alone. See Graham v. United States, 573 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Klingler v. Executive
Branch, 572 F. Supp. 589 (M.D. Ala. 1983). These cases were dismissed under the AntiInjunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (1982), which bars suits by taxpayers that restrain
collection of tax revenue.
9. Many of the courts confronting origination clause challenges to TEFRA have confused the issue of TEFRA's constitutionality under the origination clause with the issue of
whether the Senate can amend a bill by substitution. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 758
F.2d 456, 458 (9th Cir. 1985); Heitman v. United States, 753 F.2d 33, 35 (6th Cir. 1984);
Karpowycz v. United States, 586 F. Supp. 48, 52 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Scull v. United States,
585 F. Supp. 956, 960 (E.D. Va. 1984); Stamp v. Commissioner, 579 F. Supp. 168, 171
(N.D. 111. 1984); Kloes v. United States, 578 F. Supp. 270, 272 (W.D. Wis. 1984); Frent v.
United States, 571 F. Supp. 739, 742 (E.D. Mich. 1983), appeal dismissed mem., 734 F.2d 14
(6th Cir. 1984). The discussion of this issue on the House floor showed similar confusion.
128 CONG. REC. H4777-78 (daily ed. July 28, 1982) (statement of Rep. Rostenkowski).
These issues, however, are fundamentally different, and maintaining this distinction is necessary for proper resolution of the origination clause issue. See infra notes 285-91 and accompanying text.
10. The first, fourth, fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution, for example, are rich sources of litigation and the subject of an enormous
amount of scholarship. A perusal of constitutional law casebooks and treatises commonly
used in law schools today, however, reveals no mention of the origination clause. See, e.g.,
C. ANIEAu, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969); E. BARRETr & W. COHEN, CONSTITU-
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remains an important part of our constitutional scheme of government by checks and balances and separation of powers.1 1 The vitality of this constitutional system is called into question when an

unambiguous procedural constitutional provision directed expressly at the two houses of Congress can be so easily sidestepped

for reasons of political expediency.1 2 Constitutional violations,
whether of article I or the Bill of Rights, ultimately affect individuals. As Justice Lamar noted in Lake County v. Rollins: "The liberty of the citizen, and his security in all his rights, in a large degree depend upon the rigid adherence to the provisions of the
constitution and the laws, and their faithful performance."1 '
This constitutional crisis is threefold. First, Congress passed
TEFRA in violation of the origination clause.1 4 Second, the fed(7th ed. 1985); P. BREST & S. LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING (2d ed. 1983); D. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT 1789-1888
(1985); P. FREUND, A. SUTHERLAND, M. HOWE & E. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (4th ed.
1977); G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (11th ed. 1985); P. KAUPER & F. BEYTAGH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 1980 & Supp. 1982); W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, J. CHOPER & S.
SHIFFRIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (6th ed. 1986); J.NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1983); S. WEAVER, CONSTrUTIONAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION
TIONAL LAW

(1946). In contrast, constitutional law treatises published during the 19th and early 20th
centuries regularly discussed the origination clause. See infra notes 148, 151, 154. Before
the recent challenges to TEFRA, the last Supreme Court case involving the origination
clause was Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911) (Senate amendment substituting a
corporation tax for an inheritance tax not violative of the origination clause). The last
origination clause case in any federal court was Bertelsen v. White, 65 F.2d 719 (1st Cir.
1933) (section 23 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 not a "bill to raise revenue" because its "primary object" was not to raise revenue).
11. The Constitution delegates certain governmental powers to the federal government and reserves the rest to the states or to the people. US. CONST. amend. X. This division is often called federalism. The Constitution also divides federal power among three
branches: the legislative (article I), executive (article II), and judicial (article III). This division is often called the separation of powers. Article I, section 7, which contains the origination clause, "is one of several in the Constitution which implement the 'separation of
powers' doctrine." Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

As Section IV of this Comment demonstrates, the standing of litigants to bring a particular action is of central importance to the proper resolution of constitutional challenges
based on the origination clause. Therefore, the standing of individual litigants can logically
be seen as an integral part of the separation of powers doctrine. See Scalia, The Doctrine of

Standing as an EssentialElement of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 881 (1983).
12. Simply put, the democrats in the House of Representatives did not want to take
responsibility for an election-year tax increase and thus forced the republicans in the Senate to originate such an increase in the form of TEFRA. See infra notes 264-82 and accompanying text.
13. 130 U.S. 662, 673 (1889). This applies in no smaller degree to Congress than it
does to the courts.
14. See infra notes 25-63, 264-84 and accompanying text.
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eral courts have decided cases involving origination clause challenges to TEFRA by individual taxpayers even though they cannot properly exercise judicial review over this issue. This is
because individual taxpayers lack standing" to satisfy the constitutional requirement that a "case" or "controversy" be present for
the proper invocation of judicial power." In addition, this issue is
a nonjusticiable "political question" which the Constitution leaves
for resolution by the political branches. 17 These branches take the
same oath that judges do to uphold the Constitution and are
bound by that oath to enact statutes in accordance with the dictates of the Constitution."' The political branches have not taken
this oath seriously in the passage of TEFRA and have instead let
political expediency take precedence over the requirements of the
Constitution. Third, even after erroneously assuming they could
properly exercise judicial review, the courts have failed to properly analyze the origination clause issue.19 Among the more than
fifty challenges to TEFRA under the origination clause to date,
only five courts have made any attempt to interpret the clause itself in deciding the case before them.20 These attempts have been
cursory and lacking in adequate authority. Because "it is ... the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
''21 when interpreting constitutional provisions such as the origiis
15. See infra notes 186-231 and accompanying text.
16. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl.
1. In Moore v. United States House of Representatives,
733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984), the court stated: "Furthermore, we note that private taxpayers have been found to have standing to challenge the constitutionality of TEFRA
under the origination clause, so the issue will not go unresolved." Id. at 956. The court
cited Armstrong v. United States No. 83-0598 (S.D. Cal. September 2, 1983) (mem.) and
Frent v. United States, 571 F. Supp. 739 (E.D. Mich. 1983), appeal dismissed mem., 734 F.2d
14 (6th Cir. 1984). Neither of those cases, however, addiressed the issue of taxpayer standing. Those courts, like all the others addressing the issue, simply assumed that the taxpayers before them had the requisite standing to raise an origination clause claim.
17. See infra notes 232-63 and accompanying text.
18. The issue of whether the courts have the final say in the interpretation of the
constitutionality of statutes in cases properly before them has functionally been settled
since Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). But see infra note 191 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 285-308 and accompanying text.
20. Armstrong v. United States, 759 F.2d 1378, 1381-82 (9th Cir. 1985); Wardell v.
United States, 757 F.2d 203, 205 (8th Cir. 1985); Kloes v. United States, 578 F. Supp. 270,
272 (W.D. Wis. 1984); Milazzo v. United States, 578 F. Supp. 248, 252 (S.D. Cal. 1984);
Frent v. United States, 571 F. Supp. 739, 742 (E.D. Mich. 1983), appealdismissed mem., 734
F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1984).
21. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). Likewise, Alexander
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nation clause in light of the intention or meaning of their framers,2 2 the failure of these courts to properly treat this issue adds
Hamilton wrote that courts should declare the sense of the law and exercise judgment
rather than will. Otherwise, the delicate system of separation of powers and checks and
balances would break down and the rights of individuals be imperiled. THE FEDERALIST No.
78, at 469 (A. Hamilton) (Mentor ed. 1961).
22. See generally R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT By JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977) (leading work representing interpretivist approach to constitutional interpretation); Eastland, The Burger Court and the Founding Fathers:Are We All
Activists Now?, 28 POL'Y REV. 14, 15 (1984) (judicial review should be constrained by "the
language of the Constitution and the intent of the framers"); Graglia, How the Constitution
Disappeared,COMMENTARY, Feb. 1986, at 19 (argument for limited, text-bound approach to
judicial review); Meese, Toward a Jurisprudenceof OriginalIntention, 2 BENCHMARK 1 (1986);
Graglia, ConstitutionalMysticism: The AspirationalDefense ofJudicialReview (Book Review), 98
HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1985) (advocating a literalist position to restrict judicial review).
The Supreme Court has often made reference to the intention of the framers when
interpreting constitutional provisions. As Justice Lamar once wrote for the Court: "'Nor
are we justified in resorting to strained construction or astute interpretation, to avoid the
intention of the framers of the constitution .... .' Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662,
673 (1889) (quoting Law v. People, 87 Ill. 385, 395 (1877)); see also Bowsher v. Synar, 106
S. Ct. 3181, 3187 (1986) (conclusion that "[tlhe Constitution does not contemplate an active role for Congress in the supervision of officers charged with the execution of the laws
it enacts" based on analysis of debates in First Congress of 1789, 20 members of which had
been delegates to the constitutional convention); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906
(1984) (analysis including "an examination of [the fourth amendment's] origins and purposes"); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790-91 (1983) (historical evidence "not only
sheds light on what the draftsmen intended the Establishment Clause to mean, but also on
how they thought that Clause applied to the practice authorized by the First Congress-their actions reveal their intent. . . . This unique history leads us to accept the
interpretation of the First Amendment draftsmen"); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651
(1977) (framers intended eighth amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment
to apply only to criminal law context); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968) (analysis
including inquiry into "the specific evils feared by those who drafted the Establishment
Clause and fought for its adoption"); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-15 (1947)
(extensive discussion of framers' conception of religious freedom and emphasis on "[tihe
meaning and scope of the First Amendment. . . in the light of its history and the evils it
was designed forever to suppress"); Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 297 (1888)
(interpretation of Supreme Court jurisdiction including analysis of debates in First Congress of 1789, "many of whose members had taken part in framing [the Constitution],"
which "is contemporaneous and weighty evidence of its true meaning"); Ames v. Kansas,
I1I U.S. 449, 464 (1884) ("It thus appears that the first Congress, in which were many
who had been leading and influential members of the convention, and who were familiar
with the discussions that preceded the adoption of the Constitution by the States and with
the objections urged against it, did not understand that the original jurisdiction vested in
the Supreme Court was necessarily exclusive"); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 72
(1872) ("in any fair and just construction of any section or phrase of these amendments, it
is necessary to look to [their purpose]. . .. the evil with they were designed to remedy").
But see Thornburgh v American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct.
2169, 2193 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) ("As its prior cases clearly show, however, this
Court does not subscribe to the simplistic view that constitutional interpretation can possi-
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insult to constitutional injury. Left uncorrected, these constitutional violations precipitate a constitutional crisis and set a dangerbly be limited to the 'plain meaning' of the Constitution's text or to the subjective intention of the Framers"). Justice White's statement is consistent with his dissenting argument
in Ingraham, supra, that the intent of the framers should not be used to restrict the scope
of the eighth amendment.
A debate currently exists over the merits-and even the possibility-of an approach to
constitutional interpretation based primarily on the intent or meaning of the framers of
the provision in question. See e.g., T. Sow.L, A CONFLIr OF VISIONS: IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS
OF POLITICAL STRUGGLES 51-55 (1987); Kommers, The Supreme Court and the Constitution:The
Continuing Debate on Judicial Review, 47 REV. PoL 113 (1985); Kurland, Of Meese and (the
Nine Old) Men, 32 LAw SCH. REG. 2 (Spring 1986); Kaufman, What Did the Founding Fathers
Intend?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1986, Magazine at 42; Commanger, Meese Ignores History in
Debate With Court, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1985, at A3 1, col. 2; Berger, Justice Brennan Is
Wrong, Wash. Post, Oct. 28, 1985, at A15, col. 1; Berns, The Words According to Brennan,
Wall St. J., Oct. 23, 1985, at 32, col. 4; Taylor, Brennan Opposes Legal View Urged ByAdministration, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985, at 1, col. 2.
On one level, one cannot claim to be "interpreting" something written by others unless
one takes account of their intentions or meaning. The emphasis of the founding fathers
was on judicial restraint, and they institutionalized this by rejecting for the Supreme Court
a role as a reviser of legislation and by separating judges from the policy making process.
See generally 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 98, 105, 108, 109 (M.
Farrand ed. 1911) [hereinafter CONVENTION RECORDS] (comments of Massachusetts delegate
Rufus King); at 120 (comments of Virginia delegate James Madison); at 97-98, 105, 139
(comments of Massachusetts delegate Elbridge Gerry); at 139 (comments of South Carolina
delegate Charles Pinckney).
Likewise, for decades after the ratification of the Constitution, reference was regularly
made to the intent of the framers when the need arose to interpret the document. See
generally 3 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra, at 419-20 (comments of Pennsylvania delegate
Gouveneur Morris), 268 (comments of Massachusetts delegate Rufus King), 473-74 (comments of Virginia delegate James Madison); 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra, at xxiv (comments of editor M. Farrand: "in later years when the interpretation of the Constitution was
discussed, many of the delegates referred to and explained the action or the intention of
the Convention upon particular subjects"); THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466 (A. Hamilton)
(Mentor ed. 1961) (it is the duty of the judiciary "to declare all acts contrary to the manifest
tenor of the Constitution void") (emphasis added); 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 191 (G.
Hunt ed. 1910). Justice Iredell wrote for the Supreme Court in Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 199, 267 (1796), that it was "too apt, in estimating a law passed at a remote period,
to combine in our consideration, all the subsequent events which have had an influence
upon it, instead of confining ourselves (which we ought to do) to the existing circumstances
at the time of its passing." Resort to the intention or meaning of the framers is particularly
appropriate when interpreting a procedural constitutional provision directed at the two
houses of Congress rather than substantive provisions directed at individual citizens.
Even under a more restrictive view of the role of history in constitutional interpretation, resort to the intent or meaning of the framers with respect to the origination clause
would still be appropriate. See generally Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in
ConstitutionalInterpretation,31 U. CHI. L. REV. 502 (1964) (history is reliable guide to understanding evils an enactment was designed to counteract). The passage of TEFRA raises
exactly the sort of issue and problems that concerned the framers of the origination clause.
See infra notes 98, 141, 160, 269-71 and accompanying text.
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ous precedent.
In addition to describing the provisions and passage of
TEFRA,23 a thorough understanding of this issue requires an examination of the origination clause from two important perspectives. The first is an original perspective-that of the framers of
the Constitution. The debates and proceedings of the convention
that produced the Constitution in 1787, along with the work of
some early constitutional commentators, will provide an understanding of the purposes behind the inclusion of the origination
clause in the Constitution and the important part it continues to
play in our constitutional framework. This will also help answer
the question whether the clause is still a useful part of the Constitution or simply "a quaint-perhaps unenforceable-relic of
American revolutionary folklore.

' 24

The second perspective is a

functional one-that of the legislative and judicial branches in
practice since 1787. This perspective further helps answer the
specific question at the heart of TEFRA's constitutionality under
the origination clause-the meaning of the phrase "bills for raising revenue." The constitutionality of TEFRA's passage can only
be understood against this backdrop.
This Comment will first describe TEFRA and the events surrounding its passage. Second, it will examine the origination
clause through the development of the original and functional
perspectives. Third, it will assess whether the courts have authority to adjudicate this issue. Fourth, it will assess the specific question of TEFRA's constitutionality under the origination clause.
II. TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982

A description of TEFRA and the events surrounding its passage is necessary before turning to an analysis of its constitutionality under the origination clause. TEFRA, in the most technical
23. See infra notes 25-63 and accompanying text.
24.

Taylor, Thorny QuestionsIn Tax Challenge, N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1982, at D20, col.

1. This begs the question whether Congress is free to simply ignore constitutional provisions it might consider outdated or a legislative nuisance. It would seem self-evident that
Congress is bound to follow the dictates of the Constitution until such time as it exercises
its power to initiate the constitutional amendment process. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at
470 (A. Hamilton) (Mentor ed. 1961) ("Until the people have, by some solemn and authoritative act, annulled or changed the established form, it is binding upon themselves collectively, as well as individually; and no presumption, or even knowledge of their sentiments,
can warrant "'eirrepresentatives in a departure from it prior to such an act.").
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sense, did not originally appear for the first time in the Senate.
Rather, the course of legislative activity that eventually produced
TEFRA began in the House of Representatives with the passage
of a small, obscure measure. 25 The Senate turned that bill into
TEFRA by an amendment in the nature of a substitute. Therefore, the constitutionality of the Senate's amendment must be
measured first by whether the original bill was one for raising revenue. If it was, TEFRA is constitutional under the origination
clause because the Senate was merely exercising its express power
of amending revenue-raising bills. If, on the other hand, H.R.
4961 was not a bill for raising revenue, the question is whether
TEFRA is itself a revenue-raising measure. If not, then the origination clause is not implicated. If, however, H.R. 4961 was not a
revenue-raising measure and the Senate amendment was, then
TEFRA is unconstitutional because the origination clause requires
that it have originated in the House.2 6
A. H.R. 4961
Thirteen members of the House of Representatives introduced H.R. 4961, "The Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1981, ' ' 27
on November 13, 1981. This measure was labeled a "bill to make
miscellaneous changes in the tax laws." 2 H.R. 4961 combined
25. H.R. 4961, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
26. An argument might be made concerning the distinction between a bill initiated by
the Senate and an amendment by the Senate to a bill received from the House. The origination clause specifically states, however, that where revenue-raising legislation is concerned, the Senate may propose or concur on amendments only after a revenue-raising
measure has originated in the House. As will be developed, the proper test of whether a
measure is a "bill for raising revenue" within the meaning of the origination clause is
whether its purpose is to raise revenue. See infra notes 153-57, 169-85 and accompanying
text. This test can be applied to Senate amendments as well as to Senate bills. Indeed,
evaluating Senate amendments and bills in the same way under the clause is necessary to
avoid emasculating its effect.
27. H.R. 4961, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). The bill's sponsors were: Fortney H.
Stark (D-Cal.), John J. Duncan (R-Tenn.), Ken Holland (D-S.C.), Wyche Fowler, Jr. (D-Ga.),
Marty Russo (D-Ill.), Robert T. Matsui (D-Cal.), Cecil Heftel (D-Haw.), Frank J. Guarini (DN.J.), Richard T. Schulze (R-Pa.), Guy Vander Jagt (R-Mich.), Harold E. Ford (D-Tenn.),
Don Bailey (D-Pa.), and L.A. Bafalis (R-Fla.). 127 CONG. REQ 27,461 (1981).
28. Id. The discussion of H.R. 4961 and TEFRA will focus on each measure's revenue
provisions. Both bills have some spending provisions as well, but appropriations bills are
not covered by the origination clause, and these provisions do not affect these measures'
central purposes.
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five other bills relating to different subjects.2 9 Each section of
H.R. 4961, if enacted, would have reduced revenue.3 0 The reports of both the Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures 1
and the full Committee on Ways and Means, 3 2 as well as discussion
of the measure on the floor of the House of Representatives,"3
reflect that this bill was one predicted to reduce revenue.3 H.R.
4961, as passed by the House on December 15, 1981, would have
reduced net budget receipts each year from 1982 to 1986 for a
total revenue reduction of $976 million.3 5
Thus, H.R. 4961, as passed by the House, would have made
29. H.R. 4908 (rental of residences to family members and other business uses of residences; 2-year delay in effective date of 1976 Tax Reform Act net operating loss rules)
became sections 2 and 6 of H.R. 4961; H.R. 3262 (treatment of attorneys' fees in civil tax
cases when position of the United States is unreasonable) became section 3 of H.R. 4961;
H.R. 2860 (limitation on acceleration of accrual of taxes) became section 4 of H.R. 4961;
H.R. 2397 (treatment of lending or finance businesses for purposes of the tax on personal
holding companies) became section 5 of H.R. 4961; H.R. 4408 (refunds of excise tax on
buses) became section 7 of H.R. 4961. STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
97TH CONG., 1sT SESS., MISCELLANEOUS REVENUE ACT OF 1981 (1981).
30. H.R. 4908 (sections 2 and 6 of H.R. 4961) would have reduced net budget receipts by approximately $375 million during 1982-86; H.R. 3262 (section 3 of H.R. 4961)
would have increased budget outlays by less than $5 million annually; H.R. 2860 (section 4
of H.R. 4961) would have reduced net budget receipts by approximately $575 million during 1982-86; H.R. 2397 (section 5 of H.R. 4961) would have reduced net budget receipts
by less than $5 million annually; H.R. 4408 (section 7 of H.R. 4961) would have reduced
net budget receipts by less than $1 million annually in 1982 and 1983. Id. at 9, 16, 19, 22,
24, 26.
31.

STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., SUBCOMM.

ON SELECT REVENUE MEASURES, SECTION-BY-SECTION SUMMARY, ANALYSIS, AND JUSTIFICATION

OF H.R. 4961, at 6, 12, 15, 18, 20 (Comm. Print 1981).
32. H.R. REP. No. 404, 97th Cong., 1st Sess, at 9, 16, 19, 22, 24, 26 (1981).
33. 127 CONG. REQ 31,518-25 (1981).
34. Some courts have acknowledged this as well. See, e.g., Texas Ass'n of Concerned
Taxpayers, Inc. v. United States, 772 F.2d 163, 164 (5th Cir. 1985) ("In the form passed
by the House, H.R. 4961 was intended to reduce taxes. The total revenue effect of the tax
provisions were [sic] projected to be a reduction of revenues ..
"); Armstrong v. United
States, 759 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1985) ("The bill that eventually became TEFRA was
introduced in the House of Representatives, and in its original version, it would have reduced total tax revenues by a billion dollars between 1982 and 1986"); Schlick v. United
States, 586 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. I1. 1984) ("The net effect of H.R. 4961 would have been to
reduce the amount of tax revenue collected . . . . The effect of the Senate amendments
was an increase in the amount of revenue to be collected rather than a reduction as contemplated by the House"); Moore v. United States House of Representatives, 553 F. Supp.
267, 269 (D.D.C. 1982), affid, 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106
(1985) ("The House Report estimated that the net effect of the tax provisions of the bill
would reduce revenues by 976 million dollars over five years.").
35. H.R. REP. No. 404, supra note 32, at 38. Both the Treasury Department and the
Congressional Budget Office concurred with these revenue estimates. Id. at 38, 41.
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several minor changes in existing tax laws with the effect, both
separately and in combination, of reducing revenue to the government by nearly $1 billion. It was a measure designed to provide
relief for selected groups of taxpayers by correcting perceived
negative effects of past legislation; it was not so much a piece of
new legislation as it was a bill to remedy the effects of past legislation. For example, it provided for the extension of certain deductions, 6 the allowance of awards of attorney's fees in certain tax
cases,3 7 and the adjustment of accrual dates.38 H.R. 4961 would
not have levied a tax, imposed a duty, or taken money from the
people for the purposes of government. If anything, H.R. 4961
would have taken money from the government and given it back
to the people. Nowhere in the bill, its legislative history, nor discussion of it by members of Congress is there any statement or
suggestion that the purpose of H.R. 4961 was to raise revenue.
Rather, in both purpose and potential effect, H.R. 4961 was a bill
for other purposes that would have reduced revenue.
B.

TEFRA

After the House sent H.R. 4961 to the Senate, the first
amendment by the Senate Committee on Finance was the following: "On page 2, strike line 1, through and including page 31, line
2, and insert the following." 39 In so doing, the Senate, by an
amendment in the nature of a substitute, turned a "bill to make
certain miscellaneous changes in the tax laws"' 40 into an act "to
provide for tax equity and fiscal responsibility." 41 The bill's title,
its statement of purpose, and its text were changed. In the form
reported by the Senate Committee on Finance, TEFRA's text
alone spanned more than seventy pages of the Congressional Record.42 Its more than 270 sections covered everything from Medicare and Medicaid, unemployment compensation, and pensions to
mergers and acquisitions, airports, cigarettes, recreational equip36.
37.
ered by
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 10.
Id. at 7. This provision of H.R. 4961 involved appropriations, which are not covthe origination clause.
Id. at 17.
128 CONG. REr. S8577 (daily ed. July 19, 1982).
127 CONG. RErc 27,641 (1981).
96 Stat. 324 (1982).
128 CONG. Rac. S8577-8644 (daily ed. July 19, 1982).
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ment, ministers
and church employees, Puerto Rico, and the tuna
43
industry.
The Senate passed TEFRA on July 23, 1982, by a narrow
vote of fifty to forty-seven.44 It asked for a conference with the
House five days later. 5 On July 28, Representative John Rousselot of California introduced a resolution declaring that, in the
opinion of the House, the Senate action of turning H.R. 4961 into
TEFRA contravened the origination clause. 46 Congressman Rousselot noted the striking difference between the bill sent to the
Senate as H.R. 4961 and the bill that returned as TEFRA: "We
have not touched this bill, very few know what is contained
therein. We have not looked at it . .

.

. It is a foot and a half

thick. Now the original bill [H.R. 4961] went over-look at it
here in my hand-31 pages.

' 47

The House tabled the Rousselot

resolution and immediately sent the bill to a conference
committee. 8
This procedure of moving directly to a conference without
having debated, considered, marked up, or otherwise addressed
the measure passed by the alternate house of Congress was acknowledged as unusual.' Conference committees are formed to
work out differences between alternate versions of the same legislation passed by the two houses. In this case, the House had not
even begun to write an alternate bill. When Committee on Ways
and Means Chairman Dan Rostenkowski proposed that his committee begin writing a tax bill similar to that passed as TEFRA by
the Senate Committee on Finance, "he encountered such a barrage of anxiety from Democratic members who didn't want to
participate in election-year tax raising that he abruptly postponed
a scheduled bill-writing session." 50 Another news article noted this
unusual procedure: "Moreover, the conferees generally ignored
43. Id.
44. 128
45.

CONG.

REQ S9046 (daily ed. July 22, 1982).

128 CONG. REQ S9307 (daily ed. July 28, 1982).

46. Id. at H4776. This was the method used during the 19th century when the House
felt a measure passed by the Senate violated the origination clause. See infra notes 166-73
and accompanying text.
47. 128 CONG. R., H4781 (daily ed. July 28, 1982).
48. Id.
49. Id. at H4777 (statement of Rep. Rostenkowski), H4780 (statements of Rep. Conable and Pickle). See infra notes 275-79 and accompanying text.
50. Merry, Senate Tax-Boost Bill Poses Hard Political Problemsfor House Democrats and
Candidates in November, Wall St. J., July 26, 1982, at 3, col. 5.
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the legislative rules that normally restrict conference committee
actions. Such panels theoretically are required to operate within
the scope of provisions cleared by both chambers . . . . But the
tax conferees took a freewheeling legislative tack, sometimes even
adding provisions that had cleared neither house."5 1 Wrote another journalist: "The seven Senators and eight Representatives
on the conference committees are in the unusual position of working entirely with a bill written by the Senate. . .since the House
decided it did not want to write its own tax-increase package in
this election year.' '52 This understanding of the political context
of TEFRA's passage suggests that the members of Congress themselves did not consider H.R. 4961 and TEFRA to be alternate versions of the same bill, notwithstanding the parliamentary technique of "amendment" by substitution.
The Senate and House conference reports each show that the
text of TEFRA, in its final form, runs more than four hundred
pages,5" compared to just seventy-five pages for the entire report
on H.R. 4961 by the House Committee on Ways and Means
(which includes the full text of the bill).5 The projected revenue
effects of H.R. 4961 and TEFRA could not have differed more.
While H.R. 4961 would have reduced revenue and slightly raised
spending, TEFRA will dramatically increase revenue and lower
spending. H.R. 4961 would have reduced revenue by nearly one
billion dollars; 55 TEFRA will increase revenue by nearly $100 billion over the same period.56
TEFRA was the product of a complete substitution-by-amendment that left little more than the number and enacting clause of
the original bill intact.5 7 What is more important for origination
51. Merry, Conferees Clear a $98.3 Billion Tax-Increase Measure, But Battle on Direction of
Fiscal Policy, GOP Looms, Wall St. J., Aug. 16, 1982, at 3, col. 2.
52. Arenson, Tax Bill Moves Into Conference, N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1982, at D1, col. 2.
53. H.R. Rm,. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 691 (1982); S. REP. No. 530, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess., 691 (1982). In contrast, H.R. 4961 was less than 25 pages long. See supra note 31.
54. H.R. REP. No. 404, supra note 32.
55. Id. at 38.
56. STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., CoMPILATION OF CONFEREES' DECISIONS ON H.R. 4961 at 38 (Comm. Print 1982); H.R. REP.No. 760,
supra note 53; S. REP. No. 530, supra note 53.
57. Three sections of H.R. 4961 remain part of TEFRA: section 3 (treatment of attorneys' fees); section 5 (personal holding companies), and section 7 (refund of excise taxes on
buses). STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., 2D SSS., SUMMARY OF THE
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF H.R1 4961 at 85-86 (Jt. Comm. Print 1982).
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clause concerns, however, is that the purpose of TEFRA was to
raise revenue, while the purpose of H.R. 4961 was not. Every report and discussion of TEFRA makes plain that it was intended to
raise revenue through increased taxation to reduce the growing
budget deficit. During the Senate debate on TEFRA, Senator
Robert Dole of Kansas, then chairman of the Committee on Finance, alternatively called TEFRA "a revenue raising bill" and
"our proposals to raise revenue."5' 8 That committee's report
stated that one of TEFRA's four principal objectives was "to raise
revenue as part of an effort to narrow the. . . budget deficits. ' 59
This objective remained specifically stated in the conference reports of the House6 and Senate,"' as well as in TEFRA's official
legislative history. 2 It met this objective through a combination
of income and excise tax increases, deduction and preference cutbacks, repeal of tax exclusions, and extension of Medicare and
Medicaid tax coverage to groups of employees not previously
covered.0 3
This review of the facts surrounding TEFRA's passage, as
well as of the purposes and revenue effects of both TEFRA and
H.R. 4961, is critical to the constitutional analysis here. Ordinarily, even such a dramatic substitution-by-amendment would not
have raised constitutional problems. As the examination of the
origination clause that follows reveals, however, the purpose of a
bill is the important inquiry in determining its constitutionality
under this provision of the Constitution.
58. 128 CONG. RE. S8648 (daily ed. July 19, 1982).
59. S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1982).
60. H.R. REP. No. 760, supra note 53.
61. S. REP. No. 530, supra note 53.
62.

1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS 1486.

63. See generally STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 97TH

CONG., 2D Sass., TAX EQUITY
AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982 (Comm. Print 1982). It might be argued that H.R.

4961 and TEFRA were no different in that one merely extended deductions and the other
cut them back. The important inquiry for purposes of constitutionality under the origination clause, however, is the purpose of the measure, not its general subject matter. See infra
Section III. Under the purpose test, the fact that a bill merely relates to revenue is not
enough.
This is the only substantive argument based on actual interpretation of the origination
clause offered by courts confronting challenges to TEFRA. See, e.g., Armstrong v. United
States, 759 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1985); Wardell v. United States, 757 F.2d 203, 205
(8th Cir. 1985); Milazzo v. United States, 578 F. Supp. 248 (S.D. Cal. 1984). See infra notes
64, 175-79, 297 and accompanying text.
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THE ORIGINATION CLAUSE

The Constitutional Convention

A review of the proceedings and debates during the constitutional convention of 1787 makes clear that the origination
clause and the issues it represented were integral parts of the convention. As the convention successively confronted the issues of
bicameralism, representation, and legislative powers, the origination clause played an increasingly important role in the compromises that made completion of the Constitution possible. This
review also reveals that, as the process of compromise continued,
the definition of the class of legislative measures that must originate in the House of Representatives narrowed.0
The delegates first confronted the clause when Charles Pinckney of South Carolina introduced his May 29 proposals to the
convention and continued to debate it until its final adoption on

September 8, just one week before the final approval of the full
Constitution. 5 The clause was at the heart of the major conflict
over the mode of representation the federal legislature would
adopt0 6 and was an ingredient in the compromise over the powers
of the respective branches of the legislature.6 7
The origination clause served two major purposes at the convention. First, it was one of "several important counterpoises to
64. The clause covered "all money bills of every kind" on May 29, "all Bills for raising
or appropriating money" on July 5, and "all Bills for raising revenue" on September 5. See
infra note 146. This fact is important in considering the recent origination clause challenges to TEFRA because some of those courts interpreted the clause as covering "all revenue bills" or "all bills having to do with revenue." See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 758
F.2d 456, 458 (9th Cir. 1985) (origination clause not violated because H.R. 4961 a "revenue bill"); Heitman v. United States, 753 F.2d 33, 35 (6th Cir. 1984) (TEFRA a "revenue
bill"); Milazzo v. United States, 578 F. Supp. 248, 252 (S.D. Cal. 1984) (TEFRA constitutional because H.R. 4961 a "bill dealing with the collection of taxes"). However, the plain
words of the clause state that it applies not to bills "having to do with revenue" but to bills
"for raising revenue." The narrowing of the clause's focus during the convention and the
shift in its wording from subject matter to purpose suggest that these courts' interpretations are too broad.
65. See infra notes 71-74, 129-35 and accompanying text.

66. See 2 G. CuRTIs, HISTORY

OF THE ORIGIN, FORMATION, AND ADOPTION OF TE CONSTI-

216-17 (1863).
67. See generally McDonald & Mendle, The HistoricalRoots of the OriginatingClause of the
U.S. Constitution:Article I, Section 7, 27 MODERN AGE 274 (1983) (analysis of role of origination clause in constitutional convention).
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
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the additional authorities to be conferred upon the Senate,""8
such as the trying of impeachments, confirmation of executive appointments, and ratification of treaties. Second, it ensured that
the branch of the national legislature most representative of the
people-the House of Representatives-would have to take the
political initiative of taking more money from the people through
taxation. 69 The clause thus played a part in the distribution of*
governmental power in general and in the exercise of the fiscal
power in particular.
At first, the proponents of the origination clause jealously
guarded its dual elements of origination and amendment of appropriation and revenue bills as powers reserved to the House.
They only gave ground when a concession was necessary to prevent failure of the convention.7 0 The central role the origination
clause played and the narrowing of definition it underwent both
suggest that today it should be enforced in accordance with the
particularized meaning it was given by the framers.
The convention proceeded to address the issues concerning
the legislative branch of the federal government in three stages.
First, the delegates considered whether to establish a unicameral
or bicameral legislature. Second, they confronted the question of
what mode of representation would determine the membership of
the legislature. Third, they debated the appropriate powers the
legislature was to exercise.
The issue of originating bills to raise revenue was on the convention's agenda from the start. Indeed, this was a major difference between the initial proposals that Edmund Randolph of Vir68.

THE FEDERALIST

No. 66, at 404 (A. Hamilton) (Mentor ed. 1961).

69. An argument might be made that the passage of the seventeenth amendment to
the Constitution, establishing direct election of Senators, has changed this perspective entirely. However, the basic policy reasons for passage of the origination clause remain fully
intact. All members of the House of Representatives face their constituents at the polls
every two years; Senators spend three times as long in office. Congressmen represent fewer
people than Senators and remain in closer contact with the "grass roots." The need for the
House to retain the originating power to balance the powers of the Senate remains in full
force as well.
For further discussion of this point, see 128 CONG. RE. E3888 (daily ed. Aug. 13, 1982)
(statement of Rep. Porter); McDonald & Mendle, supra note 67, at 274, 280-81; Schulze,
The Tax Law's Bad. It's Unconstitutional, N. Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1982, at A17, col. 2; Taxation Without Representation, Wall St. J., Apr. 19, 1982, at 26, col. 1.
70. See infra notes 122 (amendment power given to Senate) and 127 (power to originate appropriation bills given to Senate) and accompanying text.
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ginia and Charles Pinckney of South Carolina submitted to the
convention on May 29.71 Both plans called for a bicameral legislature with a popularly elected lower house which would, in turn,
elect the upper house. 2 Randolph's proposal gave equal authority
to originate legislation by stating that "each branch ought to possess the right of originating Acts."'73 Under his plan, both the

lower and upper houses could initiate money bills. Pinckney's
plan, on the other hand, stated: "All money bills, of every kind,
shall originate in the House of Delegates, and shall not be altered
by the Senate. ' '7 4 These two aspects of Pinckney's propo-

sal-originating and amending-would play a crucial role in the
development of our constitutional structure of government. As
will be developed in this Section, both elements of legislative
power with respect to money bills became parts of compromises
that allowed the process of constitution making to continue. 5
When the Committee of the Whole House reported Randolph's proposals for the consideration of the full House on June
13, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, an early supporter of the
origination clause, moved to add to the general clause concerning
origination of bills these words: "excepting money bills, which
shall originate in the first branch of the national Legislature. ' 76
This motion, seconded by Pinckney, was defeated by a vote of
71. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 22, at 20, 23.
72. Id. at 21; 1 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 144 U. Elliot
ed. 1888) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION DEBATES]; 1 JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
61, 65 (E.H. Scott ed. 1894) [hereinafter CONVENTION JOURNAL]. Multiple sources of mate-

rial from the constitutional convention are used because each provides different types of
information. Farrand provides both the journal entries and passages from the notes of various delegates; Scott provides passages from Madison's notes; Elliot provides agenda items
(motions, votes, etc.).

73. 1 CONSTITUTION DEBATES, supra note 72, at 143-46; 1 CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra
note 72, at 62; 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 22, at 20.
74. 1 CONSTITUTION DEBATES, supra note 72, at 146; 1 CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra
note 72, at 65.
75. See infra notes 100-28 and accompanying text.
76. 1 CONSTITUTION DEBATES, supra note 72, at 174; 1 CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra
note 72, at 158; 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 22, at 224. Even though Pinckney's

proposals containing the first version of the origination clause were defeated, this early
effort to add it to Randolph's proposals suggests the importance placed on it by the convention. This Section will establish that the origination clause was valuable as a balancing
tool to gain compromises necessary for the success of the convention. This early effort to
include the clause, before the controversies necessitating compromise arose, shows that the
clause was important in its own right as well.
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eight to three. 7 The notes of James Madison of Virginia 8 provide the rationale for this early move to keep the origination
clause alive: "The other branch was more immediately the representatives of the people, and it was a maxim, that the people
ought to hold the purse-strings. 7'1 Madison opposed the motion,
as he consistently opposed the origination clause throughout the
convention, arguing that the Senate would represent the people as
well as the House.80 He also said that, to be consistent, the measure's proponents should also prohibit the Senate from amending
revenue bills, since "an addition of a given sum would be
equivalent to a distinct proposition of it.""1 Hugh Williamson of
North Carolina countered that "[t]he restriction will have one advantage, it will oblige some member in the lower branch to move,
'8 2
and people can then mark him.
In opposition to the Randolph and Pinckney proposals for a
bicameral legislature, William Paterson of New Jersey introduced
the so-called "small state" plan on June 15. It has been given this
label because its terms benefited the less populous states' by putting them on par with the larger states with respect to political
representation in the federal government.8 ' The Committee of
77. 1 CONSTITUrION DEBATES, supra note 72, at 174; 1 CONVENTION
note 72, at 159; 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 22, at 224.

78.

JOURNAL,

supra

Madison's notes are widely considered the most accurate and complete of any

made by a delegate to the convention. See, e.g., J.MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at xxiii (Norton Library ed. 1969) (comments on the accuracy

and completeness of Madison's notes).
79. 1 CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra note 72, at 158; 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note
22, at 233; see also C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 275 (1937) (citing ra-

tionle for Gerry's June 13 motion as the lower house would be immediate representatives
of the people).
80. This is similar to the contemporary argument that the seventeenth amendment,
allowing for direct election of Senators, obviated the need for the origination clause. See
supra note 69, infra notes 82, 103 and accompanying text.
81. 1 CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra note 72, at 159; 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note
22, at 234. Later versions of the origination clause submitted to the convention, with the
exception of the final compromise version, included this prohibition on Senate amendments. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
82. 1 CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra note 72, at 159; 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note
22, at 234. This concern is valid today as well, since every member of the House of Representatives must face constituents at the polls every two years. See 128 CONG. REr_ E3888
(daily ed. Aug. 13, 1982) (statement of Rep. Porter); Schulze, supra note 69.
83. Generally, the small states included Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, and New
Jersey. The large states included Georgia, Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia.
84. 1 CONSTrrUTION DEBATES, supra note 72, at 175-77; 1 CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra
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the Whole House, however, did not agree and reported Randolph's proposal instead. 5 In so doing, the delegates decided the
first question-they chose a bicameral over a unicameral model
for the new national legislature. By thus settling on a bicameral
model, however, the convention lengthened its own agenda by necessitating consideration of the questions of representation and
powers of the two houses. This also set the stage for the power
struggles between the large and small states that followed."8 The
remainder of the convention would be fraught with disputes over
the basis for representation in the two branches and the powers to
be held by each. The power of originating money bills, therefore,
took on added significance as a balancing force in these debates. 7
The debate between the large and small states over representation in the Senate 8 continued on June 30 when Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut moved that each state be allowed an equal
vote in the second branch.89 Ellsworth made it clear that no formulation of a general government would be approved without
equal representation in the Senate. After protracted debate, Dr.
Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania helped clarify the issues and
proposed a compromise. He capsuled the core of the debate:
"The diversity of opinions turns on two points. If a proportional
representation takes place, the small States contend that their liberties will be in danger. If an equality of votes is to be put in its
place, the large States say their money will be in danger." 1
Ellsworth's motion was technically defeated on July 2, but the
note 72, at 163-67; 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 22, at 242-45.
85. 1 CONSTITUTION DEBATES, supra note 72, at 181-83; 1 CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra
note 72, at 196; 1 CONVENTION RECORDS,supra note 22, at 313. It is important to note that
these resolutions allowed both houses to originate all bills.
86. Madison remarked that "[t]he great difficulty lies in the affair of Representation;
and if this could be adjusted, all others would be surmountable." 1 CONVENTION RECORDS,
supra note 22, at 321.
87. See infra notes 94-128 and accompanying text.
88. The issue with respect to representation in the lower house was whether it would
be on the basis of population, property, or taxes paid. See McDonald & Mendle, supra note
67, at 278.
89. 1 CONSTrrtmON DEBATES, supra note 72, at 192; 1 CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra
note 72, at 271; 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 22, at 482-88.
90. 1 CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra note 72, at 271; 1 CONVENTION RECORDS,supra note
22, at 482.
91. 1 CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra note 72, at 278; 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note
22, at 488. Dr. Franklin's proposal is detailed in 1 CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra note 72, at
278-79; 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 22, at 507-08.
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vote was even at five to five. 2 This reflected the deadlock in the
convention over the representation issue. As a result, the convention appointed a committee to*seek a compromise. As one delegate put it: "Some compromise seemed to be necessary, the States
being exactly divided on the question for an equality of votes in
93
the second branch.9
The committee reported back three days later and proposed,
in what has been labeled the "Great Compromise," that the
House be proportioned according to population and that each
state have an equal vote in the Senate. To make such a formulation possible, however, it was necessary to revive the origination
clause, which had been absent from consideration since Randolph's original proposals had been reported. The committee now
recommended that "all Bills for raising or appropriating money
• . .shall originate in the first Branch of the Legislature, and shall
not be altered or amended by the second branch."" 4
During debate on the committee report, Nathaniel Gorham
of Massachusetts noted that the proposal contained provisions
"mutually conditioned" on each other. One aspect of the compromise struck between the smaller and larger states was that the former would gain equal representation in the Senate and that the
latter would gain for the House, which it controlled, the exclusive
privilege of originating and amending all bills to raise revenue.
When Gorham questioned how the committee had viewed the
compromise, committee member Gerry responded that the report
was agreed to "merely in order that some ground of accommodation might be proposed. Those opposed to the equality of votes
have only assented conditionally . . . ."5Ellsworth accepted the
92.

1 CONSTITUTION DEBATES, supra note 72, at 193; 1 CONVENTION

JOURNAL,

Supra

note 72, at 284; 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 22, at 509. States voting in favor of
equal representation included the small states of Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, and
New Jersey, joined by New York; states voting against equal representation included the
large states of Massachusetts, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia.
93. 1 CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra note 72, at 284; 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note
22, at 511. Roger Sherman of Connecticut said that the convention was now at "full stop."
Madison, on the other hand, preferred to battle the issue in the full House rather than
send it to a committee for resolution. 1 CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra note 72, at 289; 1
CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 22, at 515.
94. 1 CONSTITUTION DEBATES, supra note 72, at 194; 1 CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra
note 72, at 290; 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 22, at 524.
95. 1 CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra note 72, at 291; 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note
22, at 527.
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compromise because one was needed and this one was convenient
and reasonable.9 8
Madison again opposed the exclusive "privilege of originating
money bills," 97 judging the matter as no concession by the small
states at all. He argued that collusion between members of both
houses could produce a revenue bill that originated in the House
in form only,98 thus frustrating the purpose of the origination
clause. He also voiced his oft-repeated concern that the privilege
resting with the House would be a source of "frequent and obstinate altercations"9 9 between the two houses over the procedure
and content of bills raising or appropriating money.
The debates of the succeeding ten days are evidence that the
equality of votes in the Senate and the privilege of originating
96. 1 CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra note 72, at 296; 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note
22, at 532.
97. 1 CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra note 72, at 291; 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note
22, at 527; see also F. McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF
THE CONSTITUTION 206-07 (1985) (Madison's preference would be that Congress "would

have a general power to legislate on all matters of national concern" which meant that
"[e]ither house could originate all types of bills").
98. This observation is very significant because it shows that the framers were concerned that there be no political tricks between the House and the Senate that would appear in form to comply with the origination clause but that would violate it in substance.
William Grayson made a similar prediction before the Virginia ratifying convention. See
infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
This is, in fact, precisely what happened with the passage of TEFRA. The tenor of the
economic and political times in 1982 signaled the need for a large tax increase to cut the
budget deficit. Such an increase was not forthcoming from the House of Representatives,
whose members all faced reelection that year. As a result, the Senate fashioned TEFRA in
July 1982 and amended by substitution a House-sponsored bill that would cut taxes to
create a bill that would increase taxes by more than $200 billion over five years. It was this
kind of form-over-substance action based on political expediency that the framers foresaw
and wanted to avoid. See infra notes 268-82 and accompanying text. Because such a result is
possible, it suggests the need for rigorous application of the origination clause where a
controversy arises. It has been proposed that this likelihood of fiscal political pressures suggests the framers intended that the courts be the body to enforce the origination clause.
Comment, supra note 6, at 438-39. However, the remedy Madison recommended was elimination of the clause altogether, and the solution Grayson advocated was restriction of the
amendment power to the House. The proceedings of the constitutional convention contain
no mention of a role for the courts in enforcing the origination clause. Viewed in the
broader context of the standing and political question doctrines, both of which implicate
the separation of powers that the framers vigorously sought to further, this conclusion is
even less likely.
99. 1 CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra note 72, at 291; 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note
22, at 527; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77 U. Madison) (Mentor ed. 1961) ("Among
the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more
accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction.").
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bills to raise revenue in the House were conditional on each
other.10 0 Franklin, a prime architect of the compromise, emphasized that the committee had reported "several propositions as
mutual conditions of each other."1 0 ' On July 6, committee member George Mason of Virginia explained the rationale behind the
committee's inclusion of the origination privilege in the report:
"The consideration which weighed with the Committee was that
the first branch would be the immediate representatives of the
people, the second would not."10' 2 Gerry emphasized that the
members of the House would return more often to the people and
thus would have more of the people's confidence in money matters. 0 3 Franklin echoed this when he said that "it was always of
importance that the people should know who had disposed of
their money, and how it had been disposed of. . . . This end
would . . .be best attained, if money affairs were to be confined
to the immediate representatives of the people."'" The comments of John Rutledge of South Carolina, Luther Martin of Maryland, and Roger Sherman of Connecticut repeated the notion
that the dual issues of originating revenue bills in the House and
equal votes in the Senate were tied, both integral parts of the
compromise. 05
Charles Warren identifies five factions within the convention
with different concerns about the origination clause.'0 6 Some of
the small state delegates, eager to maintain as much power in the
Senate as possible, were opposed to vesting the originating power
in the House. They were joined in their opposition by two groups
of large state delegates: those who thought the clause of little consequence and not a significant concession by the small states, and
those who thought depriving the Senate of the originating power
was wrong in theory and likely to be a source of intracongres100.
101.

See C. WARREN, supra note 79, at 276-77, 666-67.
1 CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra note 72, at 302; 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra

note 22, at 543. The committee report was based on a proposal by Franklin.
102. 1 CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra note 72, at 304; 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra
note 22, at 544.
103. 1 CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra note 72, at 304-05; 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra

note 22, at 545. See supra notes 69, 82.
104. 1 CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra note 72, at 306; 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra
note 22,
105.
note 22,
106.

at 546.
1 CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra note 72, at 346-48; 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra
at 3-4.
C. WARREN, supra note 79, at 276-77.
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sional disputes. Two groups favored the origination clause: the
small state delegates willing to agree to it as a part of the needed
compromise and the large state delegates who insisted on retention of this power in the House, where the large states were more
powerful.
On August 6, the Committee of Detail was appointed to put
the work completed to date into a draft constitution. 0 7 Article 4,
section 5 of the draft stated: "All bills for raising or appropriating
money . . . shall originate in the House of Representatives, and
shall not be altered or amended by the Senate."108 By this time,
the compromise was beginning to unravel and the factions were
dividing. John McHenry of Maryland began meeting fellow delegates to organize an effort to eliminate the origination clause.10
That effort succeeded two days later when article 4, section 5 was
10
struck from the draft.
Forrest McDonald has also noted that convention delegates
with similar preferences banded together in factions. He describes
the effort to strike the origination clause as spearheaded by a coalition of three groups: small state delegates who had won equal
representation in the Senate by agreeing to vest the origination
power in the House but who now were reneging on that concession, ardent nationalists who thought the power would cause disputes between the houses and weaken national authority, and
those who objected to the origination clause because slaves were
to be counted in the census on which representation in the House
would be based."'
Delegates differed over the value of the clause to the Constitution. Mason argued that to "strike out the section, was to un107. 1 CONSTITUTION DEBATES, supra note 72, at 223; 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra
note 22, at 175.

108.

1 CONSTITUTION

DEBATES,

supra note 72, at 224; 2 CONVENTION

JOURNAL,

supra

note 72, at 450; 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 22, at 178. Even at this date, just one
month before the adoption of the final Constitution, neither the power of originating appropriation bills nor of amending money bills had been granted to the Senate.

109. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 22, at 210-11.
110. 1 CONSTITUTION DEBATES, supra note 72, at 234; 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra
note 22, at 214. The states voting to strike the origination clause were Delaware, Georgia,
Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia; those voting against
striking the clause were Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and North Carolina.
See also C. WARREN, supra note 79, at 665 (discussing effort ot strike origination clause).
111. McDonald & Mendle, supra note 67, at 279.
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hinge the compromise of which it [was] made a part."11' 2 John
Mercer of Maryland thought the origination clause such an advantage to the House that the equality of votes for small states in the
Senate would be rendered meaningless, while Madison thought
the clause provided no advantage at all, being only "a source of
injurious altercations." 113 Ellsworth was willing to stick by the
11 4
agreement.
The clause continued to be the subject of debate. The effort
to include it in the Constitution now proceeded on three principle
rationales,11 5 exemplified by the proceedings of August 9. First,
such delegates as Randolph,"" Franklin, 1 and Caleb Strong of
Massachusetts,1 18 continued to argue that the origination privilege
was an important counterpoise to the equal representation of the
states in the Senate. Second, Mason argued that "it was of essential importance to restrain the right to the House of Representatives the immediate choice of the people." 1 9 Third, George Read
of Delaware argued that if the privilege was indeed viewed as a
condition of the compromise announced on July 5, then he would
support it.12 0 Williamson, Franklin, and Mason emphasized this
fact and urged the delegates to stick with the terms of the
12 1
compromise.
On August 15, Strong moved and Mason seconded to amend
article 6, section 12 of the draft constitution to read: "Each House
112.
note 22,
113.
note 22,
114.
note 22,
115.
first two
text.
116.
note 22,
117.
note 22,
118.
note 22,
119.
note 22,
120.
note 22,
121.
note 22,

2 CONVEITION JOURNAL, supra note 72, at 481; 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra
at 224.
2 CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra note 72, at 481; 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra
at 224.
2 CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra note 72, at 481; 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra
at 224.
The effort to include the clause in the Constitution was initially founded on the
of the three rationales mentioned here. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying
2
at
2
at
2
at
2
at
2
at
2
at

CONVENTION JOURNAL,

supra note 72, at 483-86; 2

CONVENTION RECORDS,

supra

232, 234.
CONVENTION JOURNAL,

supra note 72, at 484; 2

CONVENTION RECORDS, supra

233.
CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra note

72, at 484; 2

CONVENTION RECORDS, supra

232.
CONVENTION JOURNAL,

supra note 72, at 485; 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra

233.
CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra

note 72, at 484; 2

CONVENTION RECORDS, supra

note 72, at 484; 2

CONVENTION RECORDS,

233.
CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra

233.

supra
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shall possess the right of originating all Bills except Bills for raising money for the purpose of revenue or for appropriating the
same . ..which shall originate in the House of representatives;
but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as in
other cases. ' 122 It is important to note two aspects of this amendment. First, it still reserved the power of originating appropriation bills (as well as bills for raising revenue) to the House. Second, and more significantly, the power of amending money bills
was offered the Senate as a concession.
This concession again made majority support for the origination clause possible; delegates began to agree that this formulation
was acceptable. For example, Williamson said that "some think
this restriction on the Senate essential to liberty, others think it of
no importance. Why not the former be indulged. ' 128 Nevertheless, consideration of this amendment was postponed, by a vote of
six to six, until the issue of the Senate's powers was finally settled.
The question of the origination clause was called on August 21

but not taken up.12
Another event that improved chances for a compromise was
the change of George Washington's vote to support the origination clause. He did so primarily because it was an essential point
for other delegates who Washington feared would be intransigent
onother points if this concession were not made. 25
On August 31, those parts of the draft constitution and committee reports that had been postponed or not acted upon were
referred to a Committee of Eleven. 126 This committee reported a
122. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 22, at 294. This is the first time the amending power was granted to the Senate.
123. THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 404 (G. Hunt & J. Scott eds. 1920) [hereinafter
CONVENTION DEBATES]; 2 CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra note 72, at 532; 2 CONVENTION
RECORDS, supra note 22, at 297. Delegates such as Wilson, Ellsworth, and Madison still
argued that it was really no concession at all. 2 CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra note 72, at
484; 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 22, at 233.
124. 1 CONSTITUTION DEBATEs, supra note 72, at 255; CONVENTION DEBATES, supra
note 123, at 438; 2 CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra note 72, at 570, 572; 2 CONVENTION
RECORDS, supra note 22, at 357-58.
125. See C. WARREN, supra note 79, at 668.
126. 1 CONSTITTrrON DEBATES, supra note 72, at 280; 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra
note 22, at 473. The committee members were: Roger Sherman (Conn.), John Dickinson
(Del.), Abraham Baldwin (Ga.), Daniel Carrol (Md.), Rufus King (Mass.), Nicholas Gilman
(N.H.), David Brearley (N.J.), H. Williamson (N.C.), Gouveneur Morris (Pa.), Pierce Butler
(S.C.), and James Madison (Va.).
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new version of article 6, section 12 on September 5: "all Bills for
raising revenue shall originate in the House of representatives and
shall be subject to alterations and amendments by the Senate."12' 7
Significantly, not only was the power of amendment still granted
to the Senate, but origination of appropriation bills was no longer
specifically reserved to the House-another major concession that
12
made final approval of the origination clause possible.
Finally, on September 8, the origination clause was amended
to its final form: "all Bills for raising revenue shall originate in the
House of representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur
with amendments as on other bills." 12 9 This form was approved by
a vote of nine to two."' The proceedings of the convention were
referred to a Committee of Style and Arrangement, 131 which reported on September 12. The origination clause now constituted
the article 1, section 7 of the Constitution we see today.13 2 When
the section of this draft containing the origination clause was finally considered by the convention, Madison's notes indicate that
there was no debate about the provision. 33 The Constitution was
agreed to unanimously on September 15,131 and two days later the
convention closed after the signing of the document. 13 5
127. 1 CONSTITUTION DEBATES, supra note 72, at 285; CONVENTION DEBATES, supra
note 123, at 512; 2 CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra note 72, at 661; 2 CONVENTION RECORDS,
supra note 22, at 505. This is the first time the power of originating appropriation bills was
granted to the Senate.
128. This concession was also a source of objection to the Constitution by the proponents of the origination clause. See infra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
129. 1 CONSTITUTION DEBATES, supra note 72, at 295; 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra
note 22, at 545.
130. 1 CONSTITUTION DEBATES, supra note 72, at 295; 2 CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra
note 72, at 690; 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 22, at 552. The states voting in favor

were Connecticut, Georgia, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia; those voting against were Delaware and
Maryland.
131. 1 CONSTITUTION DEBATES, supra note 72, at 295; 2 CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra
note 72, at 691; 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 22, at 547. The members of the committee were William Johnson (Conn.), Rufus King (Mass.), Alexander Hamilton (N.Y.),
Gouveneur Morris (Pa.), and James Madison (Va.).
132. 1 CONSTITUTION DEBATES, supra note 72, at 300; 2 CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra
note 72, at 703; 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 22, at 593.
133. 2 CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra note 72, at 723-24; 2 CONVENION RECORDS, supra
note 22, at 613-14.

134. 1 CONSTrruION DEBATES, supra note 72, at 317; 2 CONVENTION JOURNAL, supra
note 72, at 741; 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 22, at 633.
135. 1 CONSTITUTION DEBATES, supra note 72, at 317-18; 2 CONVENTION RECORDS,
supra note 22, at 648.
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Three supporters of the origination clause-Mason, Gerry,
and Randolph-refused to sign the Constitution.3 8 Listed among
Mason's objections was the fact that the Senate now had "the
power of altering all money bills, and of originating appropriations of money.1137 Gerry stated that even if the Senate had been
constituted on the same basis of representation as the House,
"money bills should not be originated or altered by that branch
... ,"18 He thought that too much power had been given to the
Senate in the compromise that had separated the originating and
amending powers with regard to revenue-raising bills. Randolph
would later continue to argue, as a member of Congress, that the
Senate should not have the amendment power."3 9
Objections to the final form of the clause also surfaced in the
debates in the state ratifying conventions. In the Virginia convention, for example, Grayson argued that the power of amendment
was the power to originate and, therefore, violated the original
principle of the clause.1 40 He said that the "Senate could strike
out every word of the bill except whereas, or any other introductory word, and might substitute new words of their own. 14 2 In
contrast to Grayson, Madison argued that it was necessary for the
Senate to have the power of amendment to avoid contentions and
14 2
to facilitate compromise.
Speaking before the Maryland House in November 1787, McHenry described the final nature of the compromise: "The Larger
States hoped for an advantage by confirming this privilege to that
Branch where their numbers predominated, and it ended in a
compromise by which the Lesser States obtained a power of
136.
137.
note 22,
138.
139.
140.
141.

McDonald & Mendle, supra note 67, at 279.
1 CONSTITUTION DEBATES, supra note 72, at 494; 2
at 638.
3 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 22, at 266.

CONVENTION RECORDS,

supra

2 A. HINDS, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 942 (1907).
3 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 22, at 317-18.
C. WARREN, supra note 79, at 670-71. This is exactly what the Senate did in turn-

ing H.R. 4961 into TEFRA nearly two centuries after Grayson's warning. See supra note
39, infra notes 270-71 and accompanying text. Warren wrote in 1937 that "Grayson's
prophecy constitutes exactly what has taken place, in practice, in the Senate." C. WARREN,
supra note 79, at 671.
142.

3 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 22, at 317-18. This reflects Madison's over-

riding concern with the dangers of factions and contentions. See also THE
10 (J. Madison) (Mentor ed. 1961).
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amendment in the Senate."' 4

Madison provided perhaps the most succinct statement of the
basis of the origination clause. Speaking before the Virginia ratifying convention, he stated that the principle reason for restricting the originating power to the House was that its members
were chosen by the People, and supposed to be best acquainted with their
interests ....

In order to make them more particularly acquainted with

these objects, the democratic branch of the Legislature consisted of a
greater number, and were chosen for a shorter period, so that they might
revert more frequently to the mass of the People."'

Although Senators are now chosen by direct election, the major factors cited by Madison remain as true today as they were in
1787: representation in the House is by population, the House
contains more members, and its members return more frequently
to the people for approval at the polls. In addition, the powers of
the Senate (trying impeachments, treaty and appointment confirmation, etc.) are the same, as is the need to counterbalance them
with the origination power. 14 5 Thus, the original reasoning supporting the origination clause remains valid and argues for its
continued enforcement.
This rather extensive review of the proceedings of 1787
reveals several things. Successive versions of the clause show that
the specific powers contained in its original version were given up
only when it was clear that success of the convention required
it.'14 Warren cites the adoption of the September 5 committee re143. 3 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 22, at 148.
144. Id. at 356.
145. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
146. May 29, 1787-Pinckney proposal: "all money bills of every kind shall originate
in the House of Delegates & shall not be altered by the Senate." 3 CONVENTION RECORDS,
supra note 22, at 596 (House originates revenue and appropriation bills; no Senate amendment power); July 5, 1787-committee report: "all Bills for raising or appropriating
money ... shall originate in the first Branch of the Legislature, and shall not be altered or
amended by the second Branch." 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 22, at 524 (House
originates revenue and appropriation bills; no Senate amendment power); August 6,
1787-committee report: "All Bills for raising or appropriating money ... shall originate
in the House of Representatives, and shall not be altered or amended by the Senate." 2
CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 22, at 178 (House originates revenue and appropriation
bills; no Senate amendment power); August 8, 1787-origination clause struck from draft;
August 15, 1787-amendment to article 6, section 12: "Each House shall possess the right
of originating all Bills except [for] Bills for the purposes of [raising] revenue or for appropriating the same ... which shall originate in the House of representatives; but the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments as in other cases." 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra
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port as the end of "this long and hard fight over a question which
had seriously threatened to break up the Convention. 1 4 7 The
Senate power to amend was not conceded until mid-August, and
Senate origination of appropriation bills was not added until early
September. The framers of the Constitution in general, and the
proponents of the origination clause in particular, were cautious
about granting too much power over revenue bills to the Senate
and intended that the power they did grant be carefully circumscribed so that the purposes of the origination clause would not be
frustrated.
The origination clause underwent a narrowing of focus from
concerning "all money bills" to "bills for raising revenue"
through the course of the convention. This change reflects a significant shift in terms of how the clause should be applied. It
shifted the focus of the clause from the subject matter of bills
(money) to the purpose of bills (raising revenue). This more specific wording of the clause defines it proper application today.
B.

Commentators

Early constitutional commentators provide additional insight
into the nature and definition of the origination clause. They
agree that it was based on a similar division of revenue authority
between the two houses of the British Parliament and note that
there had been debate in the constitutional convention 1over
the
48
applicability of this procedure to the American republic.
note 22, at 294 (House originates revenue and appropriation bills; Senate may amend);
September 5, 1787-committee report: "all Bills for raising revenue shall originate in the
House of representatives and shall be subject to alterations and amendments by the Senate." 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 22, at 505 (House originates bill for raising revenue; Senate may amend); September 8, 1787-amendment to article 6, section 12: "all
Bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of representatives; but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments as on other bills." 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note
22, at 545 (House originates bills for raising revenue; Senate may amend); September 14,
1787-final form of article I, section 7: "All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the
House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on
other Bills." 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 22, at 593.
147. C. WARREN, supra note 79, at 670.
148. See, e.g., 1 T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 268 (8th ed. 1927); S, MILLER,
LECTUREs ON THE CONSTITUTION 205-08 (1893); 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 338-40 (1833); 1 F. THORPE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES 505 (1970 ed.). But see 1 G. CURTIS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 452-53 (1889). The House of Lords lost the power to amend revenue bills
in 1911. See T. COOLEY, supra, at 268 n.1; McDonald & Mendle, supra note 67, at 275.
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Commentators also provide insight into the situations where a
potential problem of constitutionality under the origination clause
might arise. In so doing, they note the fact that the focus of the
clause and the class of legislation to which it refers narrowed during the course of the convention. For example, the origination
clause does not refer to appropriation or spending bills but only to
revenue bills. 149 The power of originating appropriation bills was
forfeited late in the convention to save the existence of the origination clause as a viable part of the Constitution.'" One commentator emphasizes that the more specific "bills for raising revenue"
wording has "a distinct meaning as used in this clause."' 5 The
August 15 rewording by the convention to include the phrase
"for the purpose of revenue" was a significant development. Watson has noted: "Prior to that the clause had related to 'money
bills,' which would include bills for any purpose, but now a limitation to a specific purpose had been made by the report. 15
This shift in definition from the subject matter to the purpose
of bills helps distinguish between the different types of legislation
that come under the ambit of the origination clause. These commentators have argued that a "purpose test" is appropriate 5 s and
have found that some of the early origination clause cases set
forth a purpose test as well. 1 " "[T]he expression 'bills for raising
revenue' would have reference to laws for the purpose of obtaining money by some form of taxation. . . to be used in supplying the wants of the government .... ,"5The clause does not

refer to bills that have the effect of raising money for other purposes or through a vehicle other than taxation such as the sale of
149. See 2 G. Curtis, supra note 66, at 222 n.3; S. MI.ER, supra note 148, at 204-05.
150. This power was granted the Senate in the proposal of September 5. See supra
note 127 and accompanying text.
151. 1 D. WATSON, WATSON ON THE CoNsTrrUTMON 344 (1910).
152. Id. at 345; see also supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing wording of
August 15 amendment); 2 G. CUns (discussing August 15 amendment as attempt to
"avoid an alleged ambiguity").
153. See, e.g., S. MITT R, supra note 148, at 204.
154. Watson, for example, cites United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 567 (1875) (act

establishing a postal money-order system not a revenue law because it had no "purpose of
revenue in view.") I D. WATSON, supra note 151, at 351. Willoughby cites Twin City Bank
v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) (holding that "a bill, the primary purpose of which is not

the raising of revenue, is not a measure that must originate in the House ....").2 WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 656 (2d ed. 1929).
155.

S. MILLEa, supra note 148, at 204.
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public land or securities.5 6 In short, "the history of the origin of
the power . . . abundantly proves, that it has been confined to
bills to levy taxes in the strict sense of the words, and has not been
157
understood to extend to bills for other purposes.11
Finally, these commentators have acknowledged that the
clause is susceptible to legislative abuse,""8 echoing Madison's
warnings in the constitutional convention and Grayson's objections in the Virginia ratifying convention. Watson noted that
granting the power to "amend" or "alter" to the Senate may
mean that disputes can easily arise as to whether a particular Senate measure is a proper amendment or an improper origination. 15 9 Corwin's treatise went so far as to state that "the provision
is otherwise negligible, inasmuch as the Senate may 'amend' any
bill from the House by substituting an entirely new measure
under the enacting clause." 160 Because, however, the clause was so
important to the formation of the Constitution,"6 ' and because
the purpose test provides a means of dealing with questionable
Senate amendments, the origination clause should be not be abandoned simply because it is susceptible to legislative abuse. Rather,
it should be rigorously enforced; indeed, the possibility of legislative abuse, today as in 1787, itself demands rigorous enforcement.
C.

The Functional Understanding

The original understanding of the origination clause was
that it required bills raising revenue through "the imposition of
taxes"'' 6 2 to originate in the House of Representatives. This restriction did not apply to measures raising revenue only inciden156. 2 J. STORY, supra note 148, at 342-43.
157. Id. at 343; see also 1 T. COOLEy, supra note 148, at 268 n.1 (also confining scope
of clause to levying taxes in the strict sense of the word).
158. See 2 J. STORY, supra note 148, at 340.
159. 1 D. WATSON, supra note 151, at 346.
160. E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 34 (H. Chase & C.
Ducat rev. 14th ed. 1978). This, like Grayson's prediction before the Virginia ratifying
convention, describes what the Senate did to create TEFRA. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
161. Curtis highlights the important role of the clause in the compromises of the convention. See 2 G. CURTIS, supra note 66, at 216-17. Watson likewise notes the very difficult
questions the convention confronted with respect to the origination clause. See 1 D. WATSON, supra note 151, at 349-50.
162. 2 J. STORY, supra note 148, at 341.
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tally or through means other than taxation.'6 3 It did not apply to
appropriation bills because, by the end of the constitutional convention, the power to originate appropriation bills had been given
to the Senate."6 Through this narrowing of meaning, then, the
origination clause became a rather specifically defined procedural
requirement that the framers of the Constitution expected to be
followed within the range of application it retained.
The focus of this inquiry must be to further develop the definition of that class of legislation the origination clause requires be
initiated by the House of Representatives. Evaluating the constitutionality of a measure under the clause requires isolating and applying this definition because the clause does not consider all bills
concerned with revenue or money. It applies only to "bills for
raising revenue," not to "money bills" in general. 5 The operation of the clause in the affairs of the House and Senate, as well as
what little case law exists on the subject, will provide added insight into this essential inquiry. What emerges from this review is
that, consistent with the view of early commentators noted above,
analysis under the origination clause must look to the purpose of
the bill to determine whether it is intended to raise revenue for
government operations through the vehicle of taxation.
Although exhibiting some of the rancor predicted by the
founding fathers,166 the House of Representatives and the Senate
have generally followed the dictates of the origination clause since
1787. Measures originated by the Senate have occasionally been
163. The raising of revenue through increased postage rates or the sale of land, for
example, does not come within the meaning of the origination clause. See United States v.
Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 569 (1875) ("The precise question before us came under the consideration of Mr. Justice Story, in the United States v. Mayo, I Gall. 396. He held that the
phrase revenue laws, as used in the act of 1804, meant such laws 'as are made for the direct
and avowed purpose of creating revenue or public funds for the service of the government.' "(emphasis in original)); 2 J. STORY, supra note 148, at 343 ("No one supposes, that
a bill to sell any of the public lands, or to sell public stock, is a bill to raise revenue, in the
sense of the constitution.").
164. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
165. The very first version of the origination clause, offered by Charles Pinckney on
May 29, 1787, referred to "all money bills of every kind." By the end of the convention
the clause covered only "bills for raising revenue." See supra note 146.
166. For example, the House has argued that the origination clause covers all tax bills
relating to revenue, whether they impose or remit taxes, while the Senate has argued that
the clause refers only to tax bills that impose taxes. See, e.g., 2 A. HINDS, supra note 139, at
947.
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rejected by the House167 or withdrawn by the Senate 6 8 because of

questions over their constitutionality under the clause. In 1872,
the House passed a bill repealing existing duties on tea and coffee.

The Senate, by amendment, substituted a bill reducing a variety
of other taxes. The House passed a resolution claiming that this

action violated the origination clause by not relating to the specific subject matter of the original bill. " This resolution was referred to the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections. Its
report conceded that "the Senate can not propose an amendment
raising revenue to any bill coming from the House, but only to a
bill raising revenue.1170 The issue was the definition of "bills for
raising revenue" within the meaning of the origination clause.
The report drew from both early commentators 7 1 and Supreme
Court decisions1 72 and made clear that one must look at the pur-

pose of a measure to determine if it is a bill for raising revenue.
The origination clause "embraces clearly all bills passed in the exercise of the taxing power . . . for the purpose of raising money

for the support of the Government.

'173

The case law concerning "bills for raising revenue," or "reve-

nue laws," 174 also supports the relevance of the purpose test and
emphasizes an important element of this definition. "Raising revenue," in the context of the origination clause, implies that the
purpose of a measure must be to increase revenue for the support
of government through the operation of the taxing power. The
cases make clear that "bills to raise revenue" relates to money
17 7
176
coming into the treasury,17 5 the levying or imposing of taxes,
167. See id. at 957-61 (1905 incident).
168. See id. at 945-46 (1864 incident).
169. Id. at 950-51.
170. Id. at 952. The origination clause restricts both Senate amendments and Senate
bills. See supra note 26.
171. Id. at 964 (citing 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 880 (3rd ed. 1858)).
172. The report cited: Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897); United
States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566 (1875); United States ex rel. Michels v.James, 26 F. Cas. 577
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875) (No. 15,464).
173. 2 A. HINDS, supra note 139, at 964.
174. Bills for raising revenue become revenue laws. United States v. Norton, 91 U.S.

566, 569 (1875).
175. The Nashville, 17 F. Cas. 1176, 1178 (C.C.D. Ind. 1868) (No. 10,023).
176. Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429, 436 (1906); The Nashville, 17 F. Cas. 1176,
1178 (C.C.D. Ind. 1868) (No. 10,023); Northern Counties Inv. Trust v. Sears, 30 Or. 388,
402. 41 P. 931, 935 (1895) (quoting STORY ON THE CONSTITUTION, § 880).
177. United States v. Hill, 123 U.S. 681, 686 (1887); United States ex rel. Michels v.
James, 26 F. Cas. 577, 578 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875) (No. 15,464).
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the exacting of money for the use of the government,178 or public
purposes. 179 To determine whether a particular legislative measure meets these criteria, courts have looked at its purpose. In so
doing, courts have found certain acts not to be bills for raising
revenue under the origination clause.18 0 Courts interpreting state
constitutional provisions identical to the federal origination clause
have reached similar results.181 Other decisions, using the same
purpose test, have found that the act in question was indeed a bill
for raising revenue that properly originated in the House, making
178. Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 203 (1897); United States ex rel.
Michels v. James, 26 F. Cas. 577, 578 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875) (No. 15,464).
179. Dundee Mortgage Trust Inv. Co. v. Parrish, 24 F. 197, 201 (D. Or. 1885).
180. See, e.g., Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906) (holding an act to make public
improvements in the District of Columbia not a bill for raising revenue); Twin City Bank v.
Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 203 (1897) (holding that section 41 of the National Banking Act
was not a bill for raising revenue because "[t]here was no purpose by the act or by any of
its provisions to raise revenue to be applied in meeting the expenses or obligations of the
Government"); United States v. Hill, 123 U.S. 681, 685-86 (1887) (holding statute not a
revenue law because not for the purpose of exercising the taxing power); United States v.
Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 567 (1875) (holding an act establishing a postal money-order system
not a revenue law because it does not appear "that Congress, in enacting it, had any purpose of revenue in view"); Bertelson v. White, 65 F.2d 719, 722 (1st Cir. 1933) (holding
that section 23 of the Merchant Marine Act "is not a bill to raise revenue .

. .

. On the

contrary, it diminishes the revenue of the government"); United States ex rel. Michels v.
James, 26 F. Cas. 577, 578 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875) (No. 15,464) (holding that "bills for raising revenue" are those that "impose taxes upon the people. . . for the use of the government"); The Nashville, 17 F. Cas. 1176, 1178 (C.C.D. Ind. 1868) (No. 10,023) (holding
statute not a revenue law because not among "bills the direct and principal object of which
has been to raise revenue").
181. See, e.g., Geer v. Board of Comm'rs, 97 F. 435, 440 (8th Cir. 1899) (holding
statute not a bill for raising revenue because its "provisions raise no revenue for the government"); Dundee Mortgage Trust Inv. Co. v. Parrish, 24 F. 197, 201 (D. Or. 1885)
(holding statute not a bill to raise revenue because it "does not authorize or provide for
levying any tax or raising a cent of revenue"); Dalton v. State Property and Bldgs.
Comm'n, 304 S.W.2d 342, 350 (Ky. 1957) (holding statute not a bill to raise revenue because it did not "purport to raise revenue or to increase taxes. To 'raise revenue' means to
levy a tax as a means of collecting revenue"); State v. Lasky, 156 Me. 419, 423, 165 A.2d
579, 581 (1960) (holding a statute repealing and repromulgating a shellfish tax in a correcting act not a bill to raise revenue because "[n]o new revenue was provided in the correcting act"); In re Paton's Estate, 114 N.J. Eq. 324, 327, 168 A. 422, 424 (1933) (holding
a statute exempting certain bequests to educational institutions from taxation not a bill to
raise revenue because "its purpose and effect is rather somewhat to decrease revenue than
to increase it"); Northern Counties Inv. Trust v. Sears, 30 Or. 388, 402, 41 P. 931, 935
(1895) (holding a statute not a bill to raise revenue because "'the direct and principal
object of [it]'" was not to raise revenue) (quoting The Nashville, 17 F. Cas. 1176, 1178
(C.C.D. Ind. 1868) (No. 10,023)).
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the Senate amendments permissible.1 2 Still others, also using the
purpose test, have found measures to be bills for raising revenue
that unconstitutionally originated in the Senate."8 " There are virtually no exceptions to this pattern of emphasis on the purpose
test.'" What emerges is that a "bill for raising revenue" within
the meaning of the origination clause is one designed to increase
revenue for the support of the government through the vehicle of
taxation.18 5
In sum, with an understanding obtained by combining an
original perspective based on the formation of the clause and a
functional perspective based on the activity of legislatures and
courts since 1787, basic conclusions regarding the origination
clause can be drawn. The origination clause does not apply to appropriation bills but only to revenue bills. It does not apply to bills
decreasing revenue but only to bills increasing revenue. It does
not apply to bills for other purposes that raise revenue only incidentally but only to measures whose purpose is to raise revenue
for the support of government. It does not apply to bills raising
revenue through sale of land or securities or through increasing
postage rates but only to bills raising revenue through taxation.
182. See, e.g., Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310 (1914); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.,
220 U.S. 107 (1911); United States v. Billings, 190 F. 359 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), modified,
232 U.S. 261 (1914).
183. See, e.g., Wofford Oil Co. v. Smith, 263 F. 396 (M.D. Ala. 1920).
184. A few courts have made the same mistake as some of those confronting origination clause challenges to TEFRA and said that bills that decrease revenue are, nevertheless,
bills to raise revenue and, therefore, must originate in the House of Representatives. See,
e.g., Weissinger v. Boswell, 330 F. Supp. 615 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (interpreting state constitution). These courts did not analyze the origination clause in arriving at this conclusion,
however, and their results are inconsistent with the plain meaning, the history, and other
interpretations of the clause as outlined in Section III of this Comment. Other courts have,
in fact, expressly reached the opposite conclusion. See infra note 185. Significantly, the
court in Weissinger did endorse the purpose test in determining whether a particular legislative measure meets the requirements of the origination clause. 330 F. Supp. at 624.
185. Some courts have specifically held that a bill that diminishes revenue cannot be a
"bill for raising revenue." See, e.g., Bertelson v. White, 65 F.2d 719, 722 (1st Cir. 1933)
(section 23 of the Merchant Marine Act "is not a bill to raise revenue. . .. On the contrary, it diminishes the revenue of the government"); Dalton v. State Property and Bldgs.
Comm'n, 304 S.W.2d 342, 350 (Ky. 1957) (statute not a bill to raise revenue because it did
not "purport to raise revenue or to increase taxes"); State v. Lasky, 156 Me. 419, 423, 165
A.2d 579, 581 (1960) (statute not a bill to raise revenue because "[n]o new revenue was
provided" by the statute); In re Paton's Estate, 114 N.J. Eq. 324, 327, 168 A. 422, 424
(1933) (statute exempting bequests to educational institutions from taxation not a bill to
raise revenue because "its purpose and effect is rather somewhat to decrease revenue than
to increase it").
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The meaning and purpose of the origination clause, and the
range of legislative measures to which it applies, is rather narrow
and, hence, easily applied.
This is the backdrop against which TEFRA's constitutionality
under the origination clause must be measured. The most important question in this regard is whether the bill originally passed by
the House of Representatives, H.R. 4961, was a bill for raising
revenue within the meaning of the origination clause. If it was,
then TEFRA is constitutional as long as the amendment was considered germane to the subject matter of the original bill. If it was
not, however, the inquiry becomes whether TEFRA itself was a
measure for raising revenue. If so, it is unconstitutional under the
origination clause. Answering these questions requires applying
the purpose test.
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW

It is of little value to complain about constitutional violations
in the abstract. Rather, the better course is to isolate the nature of
the problem and to establish a means by which it should be resolved. From the very beginning of this republic, the focus has
been on the courts-especially the Supreme Court-for the resolution of matters involving alleged constitutional violations. From
Chief Justice Marshall's dicta in Marbury v. Madison that it is "the
very essence of judicial duty" to interpret the Constitution 88 to
the incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amend187
ment and subsequent Supreme Court review of state legislation
to the employment of substantive due process in creating new
rights188 to the judicially created exclusionary rule, 89 the courts
186. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).
187. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (sixth amendment right to
jury trial); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (sixth amendment right to
speedy trial); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (fifth amendment right against self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment right to counsel); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947)
(eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment); Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (first amendment prohibition of establishment of religion);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (first amendment right of religious exercise);
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (first amendment freedom of press); Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (first amendment freedom of speech and press).
188. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to abortion within fourteenth
amendment liberty); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to use contracep-
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have edged into the position of "first among equals" in matters
involving the Constitution and the enforcement of constitutional
rights.
Still, the Constitution established three coequal branches of
government. Indeed, the framers probably envisioned the legislative branch as relatively stronger than the judicial.19 0 There has
been strong sentiment throughout our history that because members of the legislative and executive branches take the same oath
that judges do to support and defend the Constitution, they have
an obligation to make judgments during the execution of their
duties to ensure that their actions are in conformity with the
Constitution. 191
One of the oldest and most established principles in federal
court jurisprudence is that judicial power may only be exercised
when there is a case properly before the court. That is, there
must be an actual "case" or "controversy" before a court has authority to act.192 Courts, in our constitutional system, do not have
the authority to render advisory opinions.193 This principle imtives within Bill of Rights penumbra); Lochner v. New'York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (right to
contract for labor within fourteenth amendment liberty).
189. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (exclusionary rule not a
"'pergonal constitutional right'" but "operates as 'a judicially created remedy'" (quoting
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974))).
190. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (J. Madison) (Mentor ed. 1961) ("But it is not
possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates."); see also F. MCDONALD, supra
note 97, at 228-29, 240. Cf. THE FEDERALisT No. 78 (A. Hamilton) (Mentor ed. 1961).
191. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 476-77 (1980) (opinion of Burger,
C.J.) (1965 Voting Rights Act prohibition of literacy test based on congressional interpretation of fourteenth amendment equal protection clause (citing Katzenbach v. McClung, 348
U.S. 641 (1966))); Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (196) (opinion of Harlan, J.) (congressional interpretation of article III "courts"); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408
(1946) (congressional interpretation of commerce clause); Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle
330 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (responsibility for constitutional passage of legislation rests with legislature); W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, J. CHOPER & S. SHIFFRIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 13-15 (6th ed. 1986) (views of Presidents Jefferson, Jackson, and Lincoln);
McCleskey, Judicial Review in a Democracy: A Dissenting Opinion, 3 Hous. L. REV. 354 (1966).
For a recent development of the view that "constitutional interpretation is not and was
never intended to be solely within the province of the Court" but that the Court is "a
partner in the shaping of constitutional law rather than its final arbiter," see J. AGRESTO,
THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 10

(1984).

192. US. CONST. art. III, § 2, cI. 1. See U.S. v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 171 (1974).
193. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 504 (1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.) (" 'This
court can have no right to pronounce an abstract opinion upon the constitutionality of a
State law.'" (quoting Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 50, 75)); Rescue Army v. Municipal
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poses separate requirements on both the parties and the issues involved which must be met before judicial review is authorized.
Courts lack authority to review origination clause challenges
to TEFRA brought by taxpayers for two reasons. First, the parties
(taxpayers) lack the necessary standing to be appropriate parties to
raise this particular claim. Second, the issue is an inherently political question which the Constitution leaves for resolution by the
political branches.
A.

Standing

The first prerequisite for the proper invocation of judicial
power focuses on the party before the court. It is most commonly
phrased in terms of a party's "standing" to assert the particular
claim being made. The party before the court must have "a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, ' " meaning that
the party must have suffered an "injury to a legally protected
right. 11 95 It is not enough that a statute may be unconstitutional

in the abstract; this does not alone suffice to justify invocation of
judicial authority. The Supreme Court has stated that it has "no
power per se to review and annul acts of Congress on the ground
that they are unconstitutional. That question may be considered
only when the justification for some direct injury suffered or
threatened, presenting a justiciable issue, is made to rest upon
such an act."196 More recently, the Court has stated that it cannot
Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568 (1947) ("the Court's refusal to render advisory opinions"); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (the
Court has "no power to give advisory opinions"); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346,
357 (1911) (constitutional requirement of "case" or "controversy" means there is "no general veto power in the court upon the legislation of Congress"); Note, Advisory Opinions on
the Constitutionalityof Statutes, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1302, 1303 (1956) ("it was determined early
in the history of the federal system that the Justices of the Supreme Court would not give
advisory opinions").
194. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
195. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 140-41 (1951). In
the present context, this means an individual taxpayer must allege "a concrete and specific
injury within the zone of interests protected by the origination clause." Case Comment,
supra note 6, at 427.
196. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923). One commentator, examining
different facets of the TEFRA/origination clause controversy, stated: "If TEFRA was enacted in violation of the origination clause, it should be struck down." Comment, supra
note 6, at 459. This Section on judicial review shows, however, that the matter is not so
simple, however appealing this sentiment might seem. The issues of TEFRA's constitutionality under the origination clause and federal court authority to adjudicate the question are
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" 'pronounce any statute. . . void, because irreconcilable with the
Constitution, except as it is called upon to adjudge the legal rights
of litigants in actual controversies.' "197 Likewise, the Court has
stated that "[t]he Constitution has many commands that are not
enforceable by the courts because they clearly fall outside the conditions and purposes that circumscribe judicial action." 19 8 In
short, to have standing, an individual must demonstrate a direct
injury, actual or threatened, to a legally protected interest or
right that can be traced to the action the party challenges. 9
Although the Supreme Court has provided varied expressions
of the contours of the standing requirement, 00 it has articulated
specific principles governing the standing of taxpayers. 01 These
cases have dealt with taxpayer challenges to allegedly unconstitutional expenditures of tax collections. They involve alleged violations of taxpayers' constitutional rights stemming from the operation of the statute in question rather than the circumstances
surrounding its enactment.202 None of the courts confronting origination clause challenges to TEFRA have addressed the issue of
individual taxpayer standing.203 Therefore, past cases on standing
separate. Maintaining this distinction is essential to the vitality of the separation of powers.
197. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (quoting Liverpool S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885)); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) ("The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of
individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive officials, perform duties in
which they have a discretion."). Thus, it may be said that the standing requirement confines the Court to reviewing alleged violations of individual constitutional rights, not violations of constitutional provisions.
198. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). Likewise, Professor Henkin notes
that "[n]ot all constitutional limitations or prohibitions imply rights and standing to object
in favor of private parties." Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J.
597, 622-23 (1976).
199. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) ("standing question . . . is
whether the constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can be
understood as granting persons in the plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief").
200. See Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (different approaches include the logical nexus test of Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), the injury-infact requirement, and the "zone of interests" test).
201. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S.
447 (1923).
202. This difference in the nature of the plaintiff's claims in origination clause challenges to TEFRA is crucial when discussing both the standing and political question doctrines, both analyzed in this Section.
203. Only one court confronting an origination clause challenge to TEFRA addressed
the standing issue, but it focused solely on the particular issue of the standing of members
of Congress. Moore v. United States House of Representatives, 553 F. Supp. 267 (D.D.C.
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are of limited assistance, relevant only in their articulation of general principles which may be applied to the cases challenging
TEFRA under the origination clause.
In Frothingham v. Mellon,2 " the plaintiff taxpayer sought to
enjoin enforcement of the Federal Maternity Act of 1921,205
which provided for federal financial grants to states maintaining
programs for reducing maternal and infant mortality. The injury
the plaintiff alleged was twofold: an invasion by the federal government of legislative areas traditionally left to the states and,
more specifically, an increased tax burden resulting from the expenditures amounting to a taking of property without due process
of law.206 The Court denied standing, noting that the plaintiffs'
alleged injury was indirect, not quantifiable, and shared with millions of other citizens.20 7
Frothingham involved an alleged injury produced by the "administration" and "enforcement" of a statute rather than the nature of its enactment. 208

Nonetheless, the case is instructive be-

cause it emphasizes that a "direct injury suffered or threatened" is
an essential prerequisite for standing to challenge a federal statute. In denying standing, the Court asked the crucial question:
"What, then, is the nature of the right.
209

. .

here asserted and how

is it affected by this statute?"
These principles were carried forward and expanded upon in
Flast v. Cohen.210 The plaintiff in this case sought to enjoin an al-

legedly unconstitutional expenditure of federal funds for religious
instruction by asserting a violation of her first amendment rights.
While again involving the operation of a statute rather than its
mode of enactment, Flast provides important general principles
applicable to taxpayer standing. The Court held in Flast that
standing rules "have been fashioned with specific reference to the
status asserted by the party whose standing is challenged and to
1982), affd, 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985). See supra
note 16.
204. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
205. Federal Maternity Act of 1921, ch. 133, 42 Stat. 224 (1921) (repealed 1927).
206. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 479-80.
207. Id. at 487.
208. Id. at 487, 488. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
209. Id. at 482.
210. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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the type of question he wishes to have adjudicated. ' 21 1 The Court
between
fashioned a requirement that there be "a logical nexus
212
adjudicated.
be
to
sought
claim
the
and
status
the
The Flast Court backed slightly away from the absolute bar to
taxpayer challenges of federal statutes established in Frothingham.
Nevertheless, subsequent decisions 1 s have established "the continuing validity of the Frothinghambarrier to taxpayer actions and
the limited breach affected by Flast, by declining to recognize taxpayer standing
in cases not satisfying the literal terms of the Flast
'nexus' test."'21 Thus, as a general rule, taxpayers rarely have
standing to challenge a federal statute under any circumstances,
least of all under a constitutional provision like the origination
clause.
The Supreme Court has stressed one additional facet of the
standing doctrine that is relevant to taxpayer challenges to
TEFRA under the origination clause. The Court has contrasted
the kind of judicially protected individual right necessary to confer standing with the more general interests shared by the public
at large. 21 5 A plaintiff will not have standing if he "has only the
211. Id. at 101.
212. Id. at 102. An extensive discussion is unnecessary here of whether taxpayers have
standing to make an origination clause challenge to TEFRA under this "nexus" test alone.
No taxpayers since Flasthave been found to have standing under this limited exception to
the bar to taxpayer challenges established in Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
See infra notes 213-14 and accompanying text. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have
strictly limited the holding in Flast to its facts. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982); United States
v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
Flast held only that a taxpayer may have standing to challenge an actual exercise of
Congress' taxing or spending power under article I, section 8 which violates a specific substantive limitation on that power. The only such limitation the Court has recognized is the
establishment clause of the first amendment. Flast, 392 U.S. at 105. In origination clause
challenges, taxpayers attack not an exercise of the taxing or spending power itself but the
internal procedural workings of Congress. They challenge TEFRA under article I, section
7, not article 1, section 8. "Thus, the Court [in Flast] reaffirmed that the 'case or controversy' aspect of standing is unsatisfied 'where a taxpayer seeks to employ a federal court as
a forum in which to air his generalized grievances about the conduct of government...
'" Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 464 (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 106). In addition, the origination clause is entirely inapplicable to appropriation measures, the object of the appellant's
attack in Flast.
213. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974);
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
214. Public Citizen, Inc. v. Simon, 539 F.2d 211, 215 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
215. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974);
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (per
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right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the Government
be administered according to law." 216 Consistent with this requirement, the Court has repeatedly rejected challenges to the consti-

tutionality of statutes brought under the claim that they deprived
the states of the republican form of government guaranteed them

by article IV of the Constitution.2
/
Applying these principles to taxpayer challenges to TEFRA
under the origination clause demonstrates that taxpayers are not
entitled to standing to bring such actions. The only provision
upon which taxpayers can rely in making such a challenge is the
origination clause itself. They cannot identify an individual constitutional right that is infringed by TEFRA's origination in the Senate rather than in the House. They can only generally assert that,
because TEFRA was passed in a manner inconsistent with the
origination clause, it is unconstitutional and should be struck
down. This is exactly the general sort of right, possessed by all
citizens (or at least by all taxpayers), that the courts in the wake of
Frothingham have held does not grant standing to the individual.
The origination clause is found in article I of the Constitution, which describes the powers and structure of the legislative
branch of government. Some clauses in that article make reference to individuals, such as those describing qualifications for
serving as Representatives or Senators.21 Section 7, however, is
directed solely at the two houses of Congress and is a procedural
directive for the enactment of certain kinds of legislation.2 19 As
Judge Scalia has put it: "When a suit by a private citizen is involved, the specificity with which the Constitution or a statute
confers a right upon that particular individual as opposed to the
curiam); Newman v. United States ex rel. Frizzell, 238 U.S. 537 (1915); Tyler v. Judges of
the Court of Registration, 179 U.S. 405 (1900).
216. Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129 (1922).
217. US. CoNsT. art. IV § 4. For lists of cases in which the Court has rejected claims
under this clause, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 223-24 (1962); Colegrove v. Green, 328
U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
218. See US. CONsT. art. 1, § 2, cl.2; Id. art. I, § 3, cl.3.
219. Article I, section 7, of the Constitution contains three clauses dealing with the
passage of legislation by Congress. Clause 1 requires that all bills for raising revenue must
originate in the House of Representatives. Id. art. I, § 7, cl.1. Clause 2 requires passage by
both the Senate and House and provides for overriding a presidential veto. Id. art. I, § 7,
cl.2. Clause 3 applies the general procedural rules for passage of bills to all other orders,
resolutions, or votes requiring concurrence of both houses of Congress. Id. art. I, § 7, cl.
3.
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citizenry at large does control the standing inquiry."22 Article I,
section 7 confers no such right.
Closely related to this analysis is an alternative formulation of
the standing requirement in terms of whether a litigant's interest
allegedly at stake in a particular case is within the "zone of interests" protected by the statutory or constitutional provision at issue.221 Under this approach individual taxpayers also lack standing to challenge TEFRA under the origination clause. This is
because article I, section 7, which is "one of several in the Consti'
tution which implement the 'separation of powers' doctrine, "222
contemplates and protects interests of the legislative and executive
branches of government, not those of private individuals. The
D.C. Circuit has summarized the zone of interests protected by
article I, section 7 as follows:
Taken together, these provisions define the prerogatives of each governmental branch in a manner which prevents overreaching by any one of

them. The provision under discussion [clause 2 on the veto power] allocates
to the executive and legislative branches their respective roles in the law-

making process. When either branch perceives an intrusion upon
its legisla2 23
tive power by the other, this clause is appropriately invoked.

The same is true of clause 1 of section 7-the origination
clause-concerning the two houses of the legislative branch.
It is apparent, then, how the doctrines of standing and separation of powers meet. If the courts do not adhere to traditional
notions of standing by requiring that the litigants articulate direct
and specific injuries traceable to the statutory provision at issue,
there will result "an overjudicialization of the processes of selfgovernance. ' 224 Nothing makes this danger more apparent than
220. Moore v. United States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 958 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Scalia, J., concurring in result), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985).
221. Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Another commentator
has stated: "One of the interests that the origination clause protects is the right of citizens
to have taxing authority restricted by the powers of popular vote. Neither the district court
nor the court of appeals [in Moore] denied that private plaintiffs would have standing to
challenge TEFRA." Case Comment, supra note 6, at 423. As Kennedy held, however, article I, section 7 contemplates interests of the houses of Congress, not of individuals. Neither
the district court nor the court of appeals in Moore addressed the standing of private plaintiffs but only inferred its existence because courts had in fact confronted origination clause
claims brought by private plaintiffs in the past. See infra note 241.
222. Kennedy, 511 F.2d at 434.
223. Id.
224. Scalia, supra note 11, at 881.
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the challenges to TEFRA under the origination clause where taxpayer standing was improperly presumed.
It might be argued that, although taxpayers in general have
no standing to challenge TEFRA under the origination clause because their grievance is only a general one shared by all taxpayers,225 individual taxpayers who paid a partial penalty under the
provisions added to the Internal Revenue Code by TEFRA have
the requisite personal stake in the outcome to confer standing.
While this situation may meet the standing requirement as a basis
for certain challenges to TEFRA-and many of this nature have
indeed been made by tax protesters-it still does not confer the
requisite standing for an origination clause claim. These taxpayers
have standing to challenge TEFRA's constitutionality because its
operation violates certain individual rights. For example, nearly
all of the taxpayer challenges to TEFRA have included vagueness, 2 6 due process, 2 7 or self-incrimination 22 arguments. These

meet standing requirements since the injury alleged is to an identifiable individual right and is traceable to the constitutional defect claimed. No such connection exists between the alleged injury
and the unconstitutional mode of enactment, however. In fact,
one would search in vain through the dozens of reported and unreported opinions on origination clause challenges to find even a
suggestion of the individual right that was infringed when TEFRA
225. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
226. Most taxpayers challenging TEFRA have contended that the term "frivolous" in
section 6702 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 6702, is unconstitutionally vague.
See, e.g., House v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 139, 142-43 (W.D. Mich. 1984), affd mem.,
787 F.2d 590 (6th Cir. 1986); Scull v. United States, 585 F. Supp. 956 (E.D. Va. 1984);
Kloes v. United States, 578 F. Supp. 270 (W.D. Wis. 1984).
227. Taxpayers have alleged that the statute requiring payment of 15% of the assessed
civil penalty before seeking judicial review violates due process by not giving them a predeprivation hearing. See, e.g., Jolly v. United States, 764 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1985); Stamp v.
Commissioner, 579 F. Supp. 168 (N.D. Il1. 1984); Tibbetts v. Secretary of the Treasury,
577 F. Supp. 911 (W.D.N.C. 1984). For an extensive analysis of this due process argument,
see Kahn v. United States, 753 F.2d 1208 (3d Cir. 1985).
228. Many taxpayers challenging TEFRA have asserted that the Internal Revenue
Service's requiring them to divulge the information requested on their tax forms violates
their right against self-incrimination under the fifth amendment. See, e.g., Aune v. United
States, 582 F. Supp. 1132 (D. Ariz. 1984), afid mem. sub nom. Brasseur v. United States,
765 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1985); Ueckert v. United States, 581 F. Supp. 1262 (D.N.D. 1984);
Bearden v. Commissioner, 575 F. Supp. 1459 (D. Utah 1983). This argument as to tax
returns had been made long before TEFRA's passage, and the ability of taxpayers to make
fifth amendment claims has, as a result, been strictly limited. See Comment, The Tax Protest
Cases: A Policy Approach to Individual Constitutional Rights, 19 CAL W.L. REv. 351 (1983).
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originated in the Senate rather than in the House. Arguably,
members of both houses of Congress may themselves, in their offi1 9 The D.C. Circial capacity, have standing to make such a claim.22
23
cuit has so held in Moore v. United States House of Representatives.
However, as Judge Scalia cautioned in his concurrence in that
case: "Unless and until those internal workings [of Congress], or
the resolution of those inter-branch disputes through the system
of checks and balances . . .brings forth a result that harms pri-

vate rights, it is no part of our constitutional province, which is
'solely, to decide on the rights of individuals.' "231
B. Political Question
Just as the Constitution's "case" or "controversy" requirement includes the prerequisite of standing for the party before
the court,23 2 so it also includes prerequisites for the issues the
party wishes to raise. The Supreme Court in Flast discussed this
dual limitation placed upon federal courts by the case-and-controversy doctrine, 23 3 noting that "no justiciable controversy is
presented when the parties seek adjudication of only a political
question. '

23

The Court has also held that the standing and politi-

cal question doctrines are separate and that "either the absence of
standing or the presence of a political question suffices to prevent
the power of the federal judiciary from being invoked by the complaining party.

25

Two circuit courts have produced conflicting

rulings on the question of whether a taxpayer challenge to
TEFRA under the origination clause constituted a nonjusticiable
political question. The Fifth Circuit ruled in Texas Association of
Concerned Taxpayers, Inc. v. United States"' that the issue was nonjusticiable while the Ninth Circuit ruled in Armstrong V. United
States2'" that it was justiciable. Despite the conflict, the Supreme
Court has denied a petition for a writ of certiorari on this issue in
229. For further discussion of the standing of Congressmen to challenge statutes
under the origination clause, see Comment, supra note 6.
230. 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 779 (1985).
231. Id. at 959 (Scalia, J., concurring in result).
232. See supra notes 194-99 and accompanying text.
233. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
234. Id.
235. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 215 (1974).
236. 772 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 2265 (1986).
237. 759 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1985).
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238
Texas Association.

The D.C. Circuit noted in Moore that the Supreme Court "has
implicitly held that issues under the origination clause are not non-

justiciable questions, by the Court's adjudication of several challenges to revenue acts brought under the origination clause." 2 9
None of the cases cited by the circuit court,24 0 however, addressed

this issue specifically. Interestingly, in the space of a few
sentences, the court found this conclusion of justiciability to be

first an "implicit" and then an actual holding of the Supreme
Court. 4 1 Examination of the political question doctrine, however,

shows that this origination clause issue is nonjusticiable. The substantial questions presented by the doctrines of standing and political question cannot be so easily answered by inferring implicit
holdings from cases that are actually silent as to the answer.
The Supreme Court has long held that when a case raises a

political issue, such that the Constitution leaves its resolution to
the political branches rather than to the courts, courts do not

have the authority to act. 24 2 The central question is, of course,
determining when a particular issue raises such a political question. Until 1962, the Court had treated each case individually,
noting which cases raised political questions and which cases did
238. Texas Ass'n of Concerned Taxpayers, Inc. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 2265
(1986). Justice White, joined by Justice Brennan, argued in dissent that this issue should be
addressed by the Court since the Ninth and Fifth Circuits had delivered directly contradictory rulings on the political question issue.
239. Moore v. United States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 953 (D.C. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985).
240. The court cited Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911) and Millard v.
Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906).
241. In the opinion, "[t]he Supreme Court has implicitly held that issues under the
Origination Clause are not nonjusticiable political questions" became "prior Supreme
Court cases which found such issues justiciable" by the very next paragraph. Moore, 733
F.2d at 953. The court claimed that other courts had found standing of taxpayers in origination clause challenges to TEFRA. Id. at 956; see also Schlick v. United States, 54
A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 84-6287, 6288 (N.D.Il. 1984) ("The many courts which have ruled on
the constitutionality of TEFRA have recognized private taxpayers' standing.
...). However, just as previous courts had simply assumed origination clause issues justiciable, so
these courts simply assumed taxpayer standing to make origination clause claims. See supra
notes 203, 221 and accompanying text.
242. See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118
(1912); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
This is consistent with the emphasis the founding fathers placed upon separating the judiciary from the policy making process. See supra note 22.
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not, but had never articulated the features these cases had in common.24 In the 1962 landmark case of Baker v. Carr,2 4 however,

the Court observed that "several formulations which vary slightly
according to the settings in which the questions arise may describe
a political question, although each has one or more elements
which identify it as essentially a function of the separation of powers." 245 Beyond a general connection with the separation of powers, the Court listed the following as elements common to issues
presenting a political question:
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or
the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. 21"

The Court went on to say that the presence of one of these formulations would be enough for the claim to be deemed a political
question; indeed, in those cases where the courts have not found
political questions, they have expressly found that none of these
247
elements existed.

Certain characteristics of article I of the Constitution are relevant in applying the Baker test to the origination clause. Article I
outlines the structure and powers of the legislative branch. While
some of the sections and clauses of article I mention duties or prerogatives of individuals within the legislature, section 7, containing the origination clause, specifically addresses legislation, not
legislators. It is a purely procedural section, requiring a certain
process for the enactment of legislation. Section 7 concerns the
business of legislating-an activity left only to the political
branches. The first element in the Baker test-the constitutional
commitment on an issue to a political department-which the Su243. See Baker v. Car, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
244. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
245. Id. at 217.

246. Id.
247. See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983);

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Armstrong v. United States, 759 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir.
1985).
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preme Court identified as being "[p]rominent on the surface of
any case held to involve a political question,"2 4 can thus be found
in the context of a challenge to TEFRA under the origination
clause by reference to the clause itself and its placement within
the Constitution.
Two other elements in the Court's list can also be found in
this context. The "respect due coordinate branches of government" and "an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made" 249 have been found to be important reasons for judicial deference to legislative determinations as
to the validity of enactments. In Field v. Clark,5 0 importers challenged the constitutionality of the 1890 Tariff Act251 on the
grounds that the bill as signed by the President and deposited in
the archives was missing a provision it contained when it passed
the two houses of Congress. They argued that a bill, even though
signed and approved by the President, cannot become law if it was
not passed by Congress. Although the Court noted that "[i]n view
of the express requirements of the Constitution the correctness of
this general principle cannot be doubted, ' 252 it proceeded to state
that this was not the only question:
it remains to inquire as to the nature of the evidence upon which a court
may act when the issue is made as to whether a bill, originating in the House
of Representatives or the Senate, and asserted to have become a law, was or
was not passed by Congress. 5

The Court held that when a bill is passed, attested to by the
Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate, signed by
the President of the United States, and deposited in the archives,
"its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be
deemed complete and unimpeachable." ' 2 " As part of its rationale,
the Court noted that the respect due "coequal and independent
departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authen248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
Id.
143 U.S. 649 (1892).
1890 Tariff Act, ch. 1244, 26 Stat. 567 (1890).
Field, 143 U.S. at 669.
Id. at 670.
Id. at 672.
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ticated in the manner stated."255
Significantly, the claim in Field was founded upon the clause
immediately following the origination clause in the Constitution.256 It takes no stretch of the interpretive imagination to see
that directly adjacent clauses within a single section can and
should be read together. This is especially true when they relate
to the same subject-here, procedural rules for the passage of legislation. In light of the Supreme Court's interpretation in Field, it
seems clear that, if a bill that has passed Congress and received
the President's signature cannot be challenged by the courts
under article I, section 8, then, its mode of passage by Congress
cannot be questioned by the courts under article I, section 7. The
Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of "attributing finality to the action of the political departments"'25 and noted the
resulting reluctance of the courts to delve into the question
"whether, as passed, [a statute] complied with all requisite
258
formalities.
Thus, several of the elements cited in Baker as indicating the
existence of a political question are present in the taxpayer challenges to TEFRA under the origination clause. A final element
indicating its existence can also be found. In Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon,25 9 a corporation challenged a tax
initiated by public referendum under article IV, section 4 of the
Constitution, which guarantees a republican form of government
to the states. 2 0 The Supreme Court, in deeming this a political
question and thus dismissing the action, noted that the corporation was not making arguments relating to the operation of the
tax. Nor was the corporation arguing "that there was anything
inhering in the tax or involved intrinsically in the law which vio-

255. Id. Professor Scharpf's functional formulation of the doctrine would include decisions concerning legislative enactments as nonjusticiable political questions. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the PoliticalQuestion:A FunctionalAnalysis, 75 YALE LJ.517, 568-69 (1966).
256. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 7, cI. 2 (requiring that all bills passing the House and Senate
be presented to the President and providing for the overriding of a presidential veto).
257. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454 (1939).
258. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 214 (1962). For present purposes, no material difference exists between asking a court to analyze a bill's mode of passage by the conjuctive
efforts of the legislative and executive branches and asking it to analyze its passage by the
two houses of congress.

259. 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
260. Article IV, section 4 reads in part: "The United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government ...."
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lated any of its constitutional rights. If such questions had been
raised they would have been justiciable, and therefore would have
required the calling into question of judicial power."281 Rather,
the plaintiff corporation was calling the political entity itself
before the court "not for the purpose of testing judicially some
exercise of power assailed, on the ground that its exertion has injuriously affected the rights of an individual because of repugnancy to some constitutional limitation ' 2 2 but presumably for the
purpose of overturning undesirable legislation. The taxpayer challenges to TEFRA under the origination clause are analogous to
Pacific States Telephone on the issue of political question. No intrinsic violation of individual constitutional rights by TEFRA has
been identified in any of the challenges to date. The plaintiffs
have, instead, attempted to bring Congress itself into court to
challenge how it did what the Constitution explicitly permits it
alone to do-pass legislation. These attempts should not have
been permitted under the doctrine of political question.
In sum, in addition to the fact that taxpayers lack the standing necessary to challenge TEFRA under the origination clause,
these challenges also raise nonjusticiable political questions that
are not appropriate for the courts to address. As the Court noted
in Field v. Clark, however, even though a certain constitutional
challenge is impermissible, it may still be true that the enactment
of the statute in question was unconstitutional. 2 3 Because this
matter is not appropriate for judicial resolution or supervision, it
is only Congress' own diligence and commitment to constitutional
principle which will protect against this type of constitutional violation. Examination of the constitutionality of TEFRA is still important, then, because the political branches are ultimately accountable to the people for their actions.

261. Baker, 223 U.S. at 150. This resembles the distinction between claims based on
the operation as opposed to the enactment of a statute in the origination clause context. See
supra note 202 and accompanying text.
262.

Id. at 150-51.

263.

143 U.S. 649, 669 (1892).
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CONSTITUTIONALITY

Applying the Principles

The preceding discussion reveals that the purpose test is the
appropriate guide for evaluating a legislative measure's constitutionality under the origination clause. Applying this test to the
facts surrounding TEFRA's passage 264 leads to several conclusions. The first is that the bill originally passed by the House of
Representatives, H.R. 4961, was not a bill for raising revenue
within the meaning of the origination clause. It was not a bill "to

levy taxes in the strict sense of the words. ' 26 5 It would take no
money from the people; rather, it would give money back to the
people. It would not raise money for the support of the government; rather, it would decrease the money coming into the treasury. Most importantly, the bill was not intended to raise revenue.
In both purpose and revenue effect, H.R. 4961 was not a bill for
raising revenue.
The second conclusion that can be drawn is that TEFRA was
in fact a bill for raising revenue within the meaning of the origination clause. In stated purpose and projected effect, it would dramatically raise revenue through taxation. The fact that it came
into being by amendment is irrelevant to its constitutionality
under the origination clause 266 for, as the Senate Committee on
Privileges and Elections stated in 1872, "the Senate can not propose an amendment raising revenue to any bill coming from the
'
House, but only to a bill raising revenue. "287

The third conclusion that can be drawn is that the leaders of
the House and Senate acted in producing TEFRA in a way the
framers of the origination clause had predicted and sought to
avoid. 268 As noted earlier, some of the opponents of the origination clause in the convention, most notably James Madison, predicted that members of the House and Senate might collude in
order to produce a tax bill that met the constitutional require264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
framers

See supra notes 25-63 and accompanying text.
2 J. STORY, supra note 148, at 343.
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
2 A. HINDS, supra note 139, at 952.
This makes interpreting the origination clause in light of the intention of its
most appropriate. See supra note 22.
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ments of the origination clause in form but not in substance.2 69 In
the Virginia ratifying convention, William Grayson also spoke
against allowing the Senate the power to amend bills for raising
revenue for the same reasons, warning that the Senate might
"strike out every word of the bill except the word whereas, or any
other introductory word, and might substitute new words of their
own." 270 This is, in fact, what the Senate did with TEFRA. As if
Grayson's speech was their script, the Senate Committee on Finance proposed the first amendment to H.R. 4961: "On page 2,
strike line 1, through and including page 31, line 2, and insert the
following"27 1 The Senate struck everything but the enacting
clause and substituted their own bill.
In the challenge to the 1890 Tariff Act 27 2 under the origination clause's companion provision in Field v. Clark,7 3 the Court
noted that the plaintiffs' argument suggested something of a conspiracy by Congressmen "to defeat an expression of the popular
will in the mode prescribed by the Constitution. ' 27 4 As events unfolded in the TEFRA scenario, it became apparent that such a
conspiracy existed to produce a tax bill in a fashion that would
hopefully pass constitutional muster. The popular media at the
time of TEFRA's passage said it loud and clear. The President
and Senate republicans had, one year before, succeeded in passing
a large income tax cut, "[b]ut now the GOP has cause to curse the
anniversary. The prospect of sky-high federal deficits . . . has
forced the Republicans in the Senate to mark the anniversary of
their record tax reduction with a record $99 billion tax increase." 27 5 A tax increase was not forthcoming from the House
even though congressional opinion was that one was needed. 7 6
The Senate had one ready but the House democrats did not want
the responsibility for it. They sat back as the Senate amended
H.R. 4961 into TEFRA and as the bill proceeded directly to a
conference committee without debate, markup, or consideration.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
Pickle);

See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
C. WARREN, supra note 79, at 670-71.
128 CONG. REc S8577 (daily ed. July 19, 1982).
1890 Tariff Act, ch. 1244, 26 Stat. 567 (1890).
143 U.S. 649 (1892).
Id. at 673.
McGrath, A No-Fingerprints Tax Bill, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 9, 1982, at 16.
128 CONG. RE. H4780 (daily ed. July 28, 1982) (statements of Reps. Conable and
128 CONG. REQ S8645 (daily ed. July 19, 1982) (statement of Sen. Dole).
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The media appropriately identified this bill: "The tax bill, born of
necessity in the GOP-controlled Senate"; 21 "the Senate tax
bill";27 and "the Senate Republicans' tax bill. 21 9
The conspiracy the Supreme Court declined to acknowledge
in Field in 1892 was obvious enough for all to see in 1982. Democrats in the House made it plain that they intended "to make
Republicans take the lead in any effort to reduce deficits by raising taxes."2 80 The plan was for a small "revenue-enhancement"
bill to begin in the House and then to let the Senate "do all the
big stuff. ' 21 This original design would likely have satisfied the
technical requirements of the origination clause by originating a
revenue-raising bill in the House and having it amended to raise
more revenue by the Senate. It might, at the same time, have lent
some credence to Madison's arguments against the origination
clause in the 1787 constitutional convention. What the House actually did, however, as the popular media noted at the time, was
to originate a bill "which included six minor, technical '282
modifications of the tax code, each reducing revenues slightly.
TEFRA was the product of election-year politics. The democrats wanted to label the republicans as the tax-increasers and so
fashioned a plan that would force the Senate-controlled by
republicans-to originate a tax bill. The House and the Senate
knew it, and the media knew it.283 Everyone knew it, it seemed,
277. Beck, The Tax Battle Heats Up, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 23, 1982, at 26.
278. Wiener, ABC's of the Big Boosts Ahead for Taxpayers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Aug. 2, 1982, at 44.
279. Karmin, Back to Basics in Economic Policy, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 23,
1982, at 28.
280. Edsall, Democrats on Tax Increase: Let's Let the Republicans Do It, Wash. Post, Feb.
9, 1982, at A4, col. 1.
281. Id.
282. Smith, Congressmen Plan A Court Challenge, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1982, at D17,
col. 5.
283. See generally Editorial, The Moral Equivalent of Taxes, Wall St. J., Aug. 17, 1982, at
28, col. 1 (Editorial) ("Democrats in the House have cast off constitutional responsibility
for revenue raising, handing it gratefully to the Republicans."); Arenson, Strong Reagan
Support Expressed for Tax Bill, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1982, at DI, col. 1 ("Because of the
House's reluctance to vote for any tax increases, it took the unusual step of deciding not to
pass its own version of a tax package, instead going directly to conference with the Senate
over a version drawn up by the Senate Finance Committee."); Edsall, House Votes to Accept
Senate's $98.5 Billion Tax Bill, Wash. Post, July 29, 1982, at A14, col. 1 ("Democrats
averted direct House consideration of the measure as part of a strategy designed to ensure
that in no way would the legislation be described as a 'Democratic' tax bill."); Cowan,
Senate Committee Reaches Accord on 1983 Tax Rises, N.Y. Times, July 2, 1982, at A1, col. 6

1986]

TEFRA

687

except the courts. Even though the courts could not appropriately
exercise judicial review over these origination clause challenges to
TEFRA brought by individual taxpayers,284 those that did failed
in their analysis of the merits.
B.

Challenges to TEFRA

Eighteen Congressmen joined on August 18, 1982, in a suit
against the House of Representatives, claiming that TEFRA contravened the origination clause. 285 Although that suit was dismissed for lack of standing,"88 more than fifty similar suits have
been brought by individual taxpayers since then.8 7 Most of the
courts confronting these claims have confused the issue of
TEFRA's constitutionality under the origination clause with the
issue of the Senate's power to amend any bill by substitution. In
addressing only the latter issue, they have commonly cited Flint v.

Stone Tracy Co., 18 a 1911 Supreme Court case in which a House

bill establishing an inheritance tax was amended by a Senate substitute of a corporation tax.289 The Court distinguished between
("Although the House ... traditionally initiates tax bills, the House Democratic leadership insisted that in this election year the Republican Senate and the Republican White
House take the lead, and possible election-day risks, in raising revenue."); Merry, Senate
Unit Today Begins Effort to Raise Taxes by About $21 Billion in Fiscal 1983, Wall St. J., June
29, 1982, at 2, col. 3 ("Although tax bills constitutionally must originate in the House, Sen.
Dole has obtained the blessing of House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dan Rostenkowski (D. Ill.) to proceed first.").
284. See supra Section IV.
285. Moore v. United States House of Representatives, 553 F. Supp. 267 (D.D.C.
1983), afd, 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985).
286. Id. at 271.
287. See supra note 8.
288. 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
289. The following are among the cases that have relied on Flint: Jolly v. United
States, 764 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir. 1985); Boday v. United States, 759 F.2d 1472, 1476
(9th Cir. 1985); Armstrong v. United States, 759 F.2d 1378, 1382 (9th Cir. 1985); Wardell
v. United States, 757 F.2d 203, 204 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam); Burdette v. United States,
57 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 86-1222 (M.D. Ala. 1985); Liljenfeldt v. United States, 588 F. Supp.
966, 972 (E.D. Wis.), affd faem., 753 F.2d 1077 (7th Cir. 1984); Karpowycz v. United
States, 586 F. Supp. 48, 52 (N.D. IIl. 1984); Scull v. United States, 585 F. Supp. 956, 960
(E.D. Va. 1984); Rowe v. United States, 583 F. Supp. 1516, 1519 (D. Del.), affd mem., 749
F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1984); Aune v. United States, 582 F. Supp. 1132, 1135 (D. Ariz. 1984),
aff d sub nora. Brasseur v. United States, 765 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1985); Ueckert v. United
States, 581 F. Supp. 1262, 1264 (D.N.D. 1984); Stamp v. Commissioner, 579 F. Supp. 168,
171 (N.D. 11. 1984); Kloes v. United States, 578 F. Supp. 270, 272 (W.D. Wis. 1984);
Milazzo v. United States, 578 F. Supp. 248, 253 (S.D. Cal. 1984); Tibbetts v. Secretary of
the Treasury, 577 F. Supp. 911, 914 (W.D.N.C. 1984); Gimelli v. United States, 53
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origination and substitution when it stated:
[T]he tariff bill . . . originated in the House of Representatives and was
there a general bill for the collection of revenue. . .. The bill having properly originated in the House, we perceive no reason in the [origination
clause] why it may not be amended in the Senate in the manner which it was
in this case. The amendment was germane to the subject-matter of the bill
and not beyond the power of the Senate to propose. 9

The fact that the original House bill in this case was in fact a bill

for raising revenue was what made its origination in the House
necessary. The fact that the Senate amendment was germane was
what made its form as a substitute valid. The background of

TEFRA is not analogous to the situation in Flint. The question
that determines TEFRA's constitutionality under the origination
clause is whether H.R. 4961 was a bill for raising revenue, not
whether the Senate may amend by substitution. Whatever the
Senate's power to amend may be, it may not do so at all if its
amendment turns a bill for some purpose other than raising revenue into a bill that raises revenue.29 ' This is what the Senate did
with TEFRA, and it is for this reason that TEFRA is unconstitu-

tional under the origination clause.
Most of the courts faced with challenges to TEFRA have,

rather than conduct their own investigation into the origination
clause issue, simply cited the first district court case to rule on the
issue, Frent v. United States, 2 2 as precedent for their holding that
TEFRA is constitutional.29" That case, however, made two erroA.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 84-1032 (E.D. La. 1984); Bearden v. Commissioner, 575 F. Supp. 1459,
1460-61 (D. Utah 1983). The late Justice Thomas Cooley stated in his analysis that Flint
involved "the substitution by the Senate of a tax on incomes of corporations for a tax on
inheritance." T. COOLEY, supra note 148, at 268 n.2.
290. Flint, 220 U.S. at 143.
291. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
292. Frent v. United States, 571 F. Supp. 739 (E.D. Mich. 1983), appeal dismissed
mem., 734 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1984). The Frent holding was based exclusively on Flint. See
supra notes 287-89 and accompanying text.
293. See Boday v. United States, 759 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1985); House v. United
States, 593 F. Supp. 139 (W.D. Mich. 1984), affd mem., 787 F.2d 590 (6th Cir. 1986);
Lijenfeldt v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 966 (W.D. Wis.), af'd mem. 753 F.2d 1077 (7th
Cir. 1984); Karpowycz v. United States, 586 F. Supp. 48 (N.D. III. 1984); Rowe v. United
States, 583 F. Supp. 1516 (D. Del.), affd mem. 749 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1984); Aune v. United
States, 582 F. Supp. 1132 (D. Ariz. 1984), affd sub nom. Brasseur v. United States, 765
F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1985); Ueckert v. United States, 581 F. Supp. 1262 (D.N.D. 1984);
Stamp v. Commissioner, 579 F. Supp. 168 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Milazzo v. United States, 578 F.
Supp. 248 (S.D. Cal. 1984); Bearden v. Commissioner, 575 F. Supp. 1459 (D. Utah 1983).
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neous findings which led it to make the wrong conclusion on the
origination clause issue. First, it incorrectly characterized the
plaintiff's argument: "Because of this substitution of the Senate
text, plaintiff contends that the Act was enacted in violation of
[the origination clause].1 294 Plaintiffs in this and other challenges

to TEFRA have argued that the statute is unconstitutional not because the Senate amended by substitution but because that substitution created a bill for raising revenue for the first time. 295 The
issue is the respective natures of H.R. 4961 and TEFRA, not the
parliamentary maneuver known as amendment by substitution.
Second, the court in Frent incorrectly characterized H.R. 4961:
"Nothing in the [origination clause] indicates that the Senate may
not amend a revenue-raising bill by a wholesale substitution of the
text of that bill.1292 The court made no attempt to examine H.R.
4961 to determine" whether it was a revenue-raising bill in terms
relevant to the origination clause. The discussion in this Comment
reflects that H.R. 4961 was, in fact, not a revenue-raising bill.
Other courts have held that H.R. 4961 was a bill for raising
revenue by asserting that the origination clause concerns any bill
even relating to revenue. 297 A careful analysis reveals that this in-

terpretation of the clause is too broad. This interpretation would
incorrectly apply the clause to bills for other than revenue purposes that nonetheless brought in revenue incidentally. However,
these categories of bills are excluded from the clause's coverage. 298 This broad interpretation, in contrast, comports better

with the original wording of the origination clause that the constitutional convention specifically rejected by its end.29
Only five courts dealing with TEFRA challenges have made
any attempt to interpret the origination clause.30 0 One cited no
authority,3 01 three made extremely brief passes at the clause,3 0 2
294. Frent v. United States, 571 F. Supp. 739, 742 (E.D. Mich. 1983), appeal dismissed
mem., 734 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1984).
295. See cases cited supra note 8.
296. Frent, 571 F. Supp. at 742.
297. See, e.g., Texas Ass'n of Concerned Taxpayers, Inc. v. United States, 772 F.2d
163 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2265 (1986); Armstrong v. United States, 759
F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1985); Wardell v. United States, 757 F.2d 203 (8th Cir. 1985) (per
curiam); Milazzo v. United States, 578 F. Supp. 248 (S.D. Cal. 1984).
298. See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
299. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
300. See supra note 20.
301. See Milazzo v. United States, 578 F. Supp. 248 (S.D. Cal. 1984).
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and one correctly characterized the issue but, for no stated reason, concluded it was not implicated in the case before the
3 03
court.
These cases were brought by tax protesters, and their complaints often included unorthodox claims.30 ' Indeed, the reason
they were in court in the first place was that their income tax returns had been declared frivolous under a provision TEFRA
added to the Internal Revenue Code.30 5 The legislative history of
that provision reveals that it was intended to deal with specious
claims made by tax protesters.3 0 8 Such claims have routinely been
found meritless 3 07 In such a context, the use of seemingly applicable precedent might seem most expeditious. Of all the claims
against TEFRA brought by individual taxpayers, however, the
charge that TEFRA was unconstitutional under the origination
clause was the one that had real merit.308
302. See Armstrong v. United States, 759 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1985); Wardell v.
United States, 757 F.2d 203 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam); Kloes v. United States, 578 F.
Supp. 270 (W.D. Wis. 1984).
303. See Frent v. United States, 571 F. Supp. 739, 742 (E.D. Mich. 1983), appeal dismissed mem., 734 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1984). Most courts facing origination clause challenges
to TEFRA have relied on Frent. See supra note 293.
304. For example, some plaintiffs have asserted a claim based on the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. See, e.g., Vaughn v. United
States, 589 F. Supp. 1528, 1533 (W.D. La. 1984); Milazzo v. United States, 578 F. Supp.
248, 253 (S.D. Cal. 1984). Some unreported cases also raise interesting claims. One plaintiff claimed wages were an even exchange for labor and, therefore, could not constitute
income. Ganz v. United States, No. 85-C-14819 (N.D. II. Oct. 31, 1985). Another made a
claim under the first amendment guarantee of religious expression. Smith v. United States,
No. 83-1673 (M.D. Pa. April 14, 1984).
305. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6702, 6703 (1982).
306. Interestingly, at least one example of a contemporary origination clause analysis
consistent with that presented in this Comment exists outside the TEFRA context. In
United States v. Ramos, 624 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), the defendant had been convicted of violating section 841(a)(1) of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Protection and
Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and was assessed $50 pursuant to a criminal
penalty provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3013 (a)(2)(A) (Supp. 11 1984). He asserted that section
3013 was a revenue-raising measure that originated in the Senate in violation of the origination clause. The court held that, although the provision raised revenue, this was incident
to its purpose "as a punishment on a convicted person." Id. at 973. Stated the court: "The
assessment is not a tax on the public, but only a consequence of being convicted of a crime.
Its purpose was to punish convicted criminals." Id.
307. S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 277, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CoDE
CONG. & ADM. NEWS 781, 1024.
308. See, e.g., Lonsdale v. Commissioner, 661 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam);
United States v. Daly, 481 F.2d 28 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1064
(1973); United States v. Porth, 426 F.2d 519 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970);
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CONCLUSION

The origination clause of the United States Constitution requires that all bills for the purpose of raising revenue through the
vehicle of taxation to support government must originate in the
House of Representatives. The dual purposes of the clause-to
balance the powers exercised by the Senate and to keep the power
of extracting money from the people in the branch most responsive to them-remain as important today as ever. Indeed, the circumstances surrounding the passage of TEFRA demonstrate that
the kind of political maneuvering that the framers sought to avoid
by drafting the origination clause remains a problem today.
The courts are at fault in contributing to this constitutional
crisis by failing to adhere to traditional notions of standing and
assuming that these origination clause challenges were properly
before them. Not only do individual taxpayers lack standing to
bring these claims, but these claims represent nonjusticiable political questions which the Constitution leaves for the political
branches to resolve. Because courts lack the authority to confront
origination clause challenges to TEFRA brought by individual
taxpayers, it is the duty of Congress to remain committed to constitutional principles, even in the world of crafty day-to-day politics. In the case of TEFRA, however, Congress "brush[ed] aside
constitutional issues in favor of political calculations .. "309
H.R. 4961 was not a bill for raising revenue. The Senate substituted TEFRA, a bill for raising revenue, for H.R. 4961 in violation of the origination clause. The courts handling origination
clause challenges to TEFRA not only lacked authority to rule on
the statute's constitutionality but also failed to give the kind of
careful analysis that such an important issue demands. Rather, in
the context of tax protest cases, they either summarily followed an
incorrect precedent or made brief, erroneous analyses of their
own. In doing so, an important part of the constitutional system
of separation of powers may have been damaged beyond repair.
It is of little value to complain about constitutional violations
in the abstract. This analysis shows that individual taxpayers lack
Porth v. Brodrick, 214 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1954) (per curiam); Cupp v. Commissioner, 65
T.C. 68 (1975), affd mem., 559 F.2d 1207 (3d Cir. 1977).
309.

Edsall, House Votes to Accept Senate's $98.5 Billion Tax Bill, Wash. Post, July 29,

1982, at A14, col. 1.
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standing to bring origination clause claims and that this issue is a
nonjusticiable political question. What, then, should be done?
The better question might be "what should have been done?"
Simply put, the members of Congress should have taken their
oath to uphold the Constitution seriously and dealt with the constitutional issues implicated by TEFRA's passage. As the Congress
acted when origination clause questions arose in the nineteenth
century, the issue should have been presented to the appropriate
congressional committee for evaluation. 10 In the present context,
this would have been the House Judiciary Committee. Rather
than give in to election-year politics, the members of Congress
should have stuck with constitutional principle. This might have
changed the outcome of Congress' policy, but a constitution is
supposed to set parameters within which the public policy process
is to function; a constitution is not to be ignored in order to make
desired policy outcomes attainable.
To give such short shrift to an unambiguous constitutional
provision in favor of end-running this mandated procedure for
passing tax legislation is to undermine the rule of law in our society. The consequences for the American people are enormous,
not only because their representatives have violated the Constitution, nor only because they cannot directly challenge it in court,
but also because the result is taxation without representation-a
major theme of the American Revolution and an essential reason
for the existence of the origination clause.
THOMAS L. JIPPING

310. 2 A. HINDS, supra note 139, at 944-45 (1859 incident), 946 (1871 incident), 95354 (1883 incident), 967 (1878 incident).

